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Mental illness stigma is an ongoing barrier to the treatment of individuals 
experiencing psychiatric distress. Many individuals who need mental health services 
avoid treatment due to fear and shame. Understanding the determinants of mental illness 
stigma is an important step toward increasing treatment seeking and effectiveness. One 
meritocratic worldview (The Protestant Work Ethic or the belief that hard work, 
determination, and responsibility lead to positive outcomes) has been consistently shown 
to be related to mental illness stigma. The present study examines the connection between 
the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) and attitudes toward mental illness. A sample of 
Marquette University students (N = 272) was split into High PWE (n = 139) and Low 
PWE (n = 133) groups. Participants in the High PWE group were primed with a political 
speech that emphasized PWE values while participants in the Low PWE group were 
primed with a similar speech that deemphasized PWE values. It was hypothesized that 
individuals in the High PWE group would hold more negative explicit (conscious) and 
implicit (unconscious) attitudes toward the mentally ill. Additionally, it was expected that 
level of contact with individuals with mental illness would be inversely related to these 
negative attitudes. Findings indicated that there were no differences between the High 
PWE and Low PWE conditions, likely indicating that the experimental manipulation was 
unsuccessful. Post-hoc analyses were conducted and revealed that PWE scores were 
predictive of explicit, but not implicit, stigma towards mental illness. Level of contact 
with mental illness was negatively related to explicit stereotypes. Implications, 
limitations, and future directions are discussed.  
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The Effect of Meritocratic Worldviews on Mental Illness Stigma 
 
 
 In the United States there is a large discrepancy between the number of 
individuals who need mental health services and the number of individuals who pursue 
those services. In addition, many individuals who seek mental health services do not 
adhere to prescribed treatment (Corrigan, 1998). One consistently recognized factor in 
treatment seeking and treatment adherence is mental illness stigma (Corrigan, 1998; 
Corrigan, 2004a; Rusch, Angermeyer, & Corrigan, 2005). Much research has focused on 
identifying the components of mental illness stigma as well as factors that lead to 
stigmatic beliefs about the mentally ill. An individual’s worldview is one important factor 
in stigma toward the mentally ill. Worldviews that include meritocratic beliefs, such as 
the belief in a just world (i.e., “people deserve what they get”), seem to be particularly 
associated with stigma. Continued investigation into the connection between, and the 
processes underlying, meritocratic worldviews and mental illness stigma may be 
important toward the goal of creating, and refining, interventions aimed at the reduction 
of stigma toward mental illness. 
 This document comprehensively explores the relationship between a particular 
meritocratic worldview, the Protestant Work Ethic, and mental illness stigma. A review 
of mental illness stigma and its effects, meritocratic worldviews, and methods to measure 
stigma is presented first. Next, a study that sought to manipulate Protestant Work Ethic 
and observe changes in stigma toward mental illness is described. Finally, the findings, 
implications, and limitations of the study are discussed. 
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Mental Illness Stigma 
 Stigma is defined as the relationship between an attribute and a stereotype that 
can manifest as negative social attitudes and discriminatory behaviors toward a group of 
individuals based on physical or behavioral cues (Dalky, 2012; Goffman, 1963; Link, 
Yang, Phelan, & Collins, 2004). Stigma is generally conceptualized by one of two 
methods. 
 Conceptualizing Mental Illness Stigma. Dalky (2012) reviewed the two major 
methods of conceptualizing mental illness stigma. The first is the model of stigma 
components as proposed by Link and Phelan (2001). This model expands on Goffman’s 
(1963) seminal work on, and definition of, stigma. Link and Phelan (2001) describe 
stigma simply as the convergence of four components within an environment in which 
the components are allowed to exist and develop. These four components are labeling, 
stereotyping, separation, and status loss/discrimination (Link & Phelan, 2001). 
 The process of labeling begins when individual and group differences are 
observed. The differing attributes are then assigned a label which, when applied to a 
person or a group, is seen as fixed and unchanging (Link & Phelan, 2001). Additionally, 
labels are often the result of oversimplification and generalization. The establishment and 
salience of labels is dependent on the social environment, meaning that labels vary 
greatly due to time and place (Link & Phelan, 2001). For example, salient labels were 
very different in 19th century North America than modern European labels (e.g., pale skin 
being a desirable trait in 19th century North America).  
 Stereotyping occurs when labels are associated with unwanted characteristics 
(Link & Phelan, 2001). For instance, for many persons, mental illness is associated with 
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dangerousness (Schumacher, Corrigan, & Dejong, 2003). Therefore, individuals with the 
label “mentally ill” are frequently assumed to be more dangerous than individuals 
without that label (Schumacher et al., 2003). Stereotyping may also become an 
unconscious, automatic process (Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983). 
 Separation is the process by which groups of people are placed into categories 
based on stereotyped labels. The result of separation is the creation of outgroups and the 
sense of “us” versus “them” (Link & Phelan, 2001). Within the realm of mental illness, 
this may be reflected by the description of individuals as a mental health diagnosis rather 
than as afflicted by the diagnosis (e.g., “a schizophrenic” rather than “an individual with 
schizophrenia”). 
 Finally, stereotyped individuals are subject to status loss and discrimination (Link 
& Phelan, 2001). In this component of stigma, groups that have been stereotyped are 
reduced in the social hierarchy. Additionally stereotyped individuals and groups are the 
targets of discriminatory behavior. This discrimination occurs both on the individual and 
the structural level (Link & Phelan, 2001).  
 The other major stigma conceptualization reviewed by Dalky (2012) was 
developed by Corrigan. Instead of a convergence of components, as proposed by Link 
and Phelan (2001), Corrigan (2004a) described mental illness stigma as a social cognitive 
process. This process includes cues, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. 
The stigma process begins with cues. There are four cues that are typically 
recognized by the public: psychiatric symptoms, social skills deficits, physical 
appearance, and labels. Symptoms of severe mental illness that are readily apparent (e.g., 
bizarre behavior in public) cue the process of stigmatization. Socially unacceptable 
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interpersonal interactions and poor physical appearance due to mental illness may also 
lead to stigmatizing attitudes. For instance, mental illness is often attributed to individuals 
who are homeless and unkempt. Labels (e.g., seeing an individual leave a mental health 
clinic or hearing that a person is “crazy”) are a fourth type of cue that begins the 
stigmatizing process. 
From cues, stereotypes, or belief structures centered on a targeted group of 
individuals, are activated. Prejudiced individuals believe negative stereotypes, which lead 
to negative emotional reactions. These, in turn, may result in discriminatory behavior 
(negative action towards stigmatized groups) which often includes avoidance (Corrigan, 
2004a). Discrimination through avoidance may be particularly salient with regard to 
mental illness stigma. The effects of mental illness stigma, and related behavior, have a 
profound impact on individuals with psychiatric difficulties.  
Effects of Mental Illness Stigma. The reaction of society to individuals with 
severe mental illness may be as debilitating as the symptoms of the illness itself 
(Corrigan, 1998). Stigma can negatively affect individuals with mental illness in multiple 
domains.  
Individuals who face mental illness discrimination can be denied opportunities 
that are essential for meeting goals in life. This can include difficulties in finding suitable 
housing as well as gainful employment (Corrigan, Edwards, Green, Diwan, & Penn, 
2001). Additionally, stigma can affect the criminal justice system in how police officers 
and others without mental health training respond to psychiatric crises (Corrigan, 2004a; 
McFarland, Faulkner, Bloom, Hallaux, & Bray, 1989). Individuals with mental illness are 
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also less likely to receive insurance benefits than those without a mental health diagnosis 
(Desai, Rosenheck, Druss, & Perlin, 2002).  
Individuals with mental illness often choose to hide their outgroup membership in 
order to avoid being labeled by society. This label avoidance is potentially the most 
salient way in which stigma reduces care seeking (Corrigan, 2004a), either through 
treatment avoidance or nonadherence (Sirey et al., 2001). Additionally, stigma endorsed 
by individuals who are at risk for psychiatric disorder may be prevent those individuals 
from eventually seeking mental health treatment (Leaf, Tischler, & Holzer, 1987). 
Individuals with severe mental illness experience more stigmatization than 
individuals with physical illness, even when chronicity and severity are considered 
(Corrigan, 1998). Severe mental illness has traditionally been viewed by the public as 
more related to drug addiction, prostitution, and criminality than is the case with physical 
illness (Albrecht, Walker, & Levy, 1982; Skinner, Berry, & Griffith, 1995). The 
continued misrepresentation of individuals with severe mental illness in the media acts to 
confirm existing stigmatic beliefs, leading to more discriminatory behavior (Corrigan, 
1998; Nairn, 2007). There are several factors that may determine the nature and intensity 
of mental illness stigma. 
Determinants of Mental Illness Stigma. A number of determinants of mental 
illness stigma have been identified in the scientific literature.  
Degree of contact with and knowledge of mental illness may determine the 
amount of stigma that is endorsed. Public stigma toward mental illness can be reduced by 
contact with the mentally ill (Corrigan & Penn, 1999), particularly in instances when 
contact disconfirms stereotypes (Kunda & Oleson, 1997). Contact may be effective in 
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reducing stigma even when contact is only mildly different than expected by stereotype 
(Corrigan, Faber, Rashid, Leary, 1999). Congruently, a person with relatively little 
experience with mental illness is more likely to endorse stereotypes to a greater degree. 
Familiarity with mental illness has been shown to be negatively related to authoritarian 
views toward the mentally ill (i.e., the belief that individuals with mental illness are 
unable to practice self-care and must be cared for by society; Corrigan et al., 2001). 
Knowledge of the symptoms and effects of mental illness may also determine 
mental illness stigma. Didactic interventions highlighting false beliefs about stereotyped 
groups have been effective in reducing stigma (Corrigan et al., 1999). Facilitated 
discussions and simulations are also useful toward discrediting false beliefs. In addition 
to reducing stereotypes, education programs have been shown to lead to more positive 
views toward mental illness (Corrigan et al., 1999). Thus, factual knowledge of mental 
illness may be a protective factor against stigmatizing beliefs about the mentally ill.  
An individual’s personal psychopathology also affects one’s view of mental 
illness, on both the public stigma (the broad endorsement of stereotypes about a 
stigmatized group) and self-stigma (the internalized application of stereotypes about a 
stigmatized group of which an individual is a member) levels. For example, individuals 
without a mental health diagnosis may hold higher levels of guilt-related implicit mental 
illness stigma than individuals with a mental health diagnosis (Rusch, Todd, 
Bodenhausen, & Corrigan, 2010b). The self-stigma of those who have been labeled as 
mentally ill often leads to personal attributions of incompetence which, in turn, may lead 
to label-avoiding and self-handicapping behavior such as avoidance of psychiatric 
services or poor treatment adherence (Corrigan, 2004a). 
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Causal attributions for mental illness also determine stigma. Specifically, the 
greater the degree that one attributes genetics as the basis for mental illness, the more 
stigma that individual is likely to endorse (Phelan, Link, Stueve, Pescosolido, 2000; 
Rusch et al., 2010b). This is directly related to the perceived controllability and 
dangerousness of mental illness. When individuals see mental illness as a stable trait, 
they generally assign less responsibility to the mentally ill for their illness. However, 
more social distance and avoidance behavior are typically endorsed when mental illness 
is perceived to be unchanging. Biologically oriented causal attributions lead to more 
perceived dangerousness, leading to even greater stigma and further social distance 
(Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 1999; Stuber, Rocha, Christian, & 
Link, 2014). 
Finally, worldview affects the degree to which one endorses mental illness stigma 
(Rusch, Todd, Bodenhausen, & Corrigan, 2010a). Specifically, meritocratic views of the 
world are positively related to stigmatic attitudes toward individuals with mental illness.  
Summary. Stigma is the relationship between an attribute and a stereotype 
(Goffman, 1963). Mental illness stigma can be seen as a convergence of factors (labeling, 
stereotyping, separation, and status loss/discrimination; Link & Phelan, 2001) or as a 
social-cognitive process (involving cues, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination; 
Corrigan, 2004a). Mental illness stigma has a comprehensively negative effect on 
individuals with psychiatric difficulties that may be as debilitating as the symptoms of 
mental illness. Stigma toward the mentally ill may be determined by a number of factors, 
including one’s degree of contact with and knowledge of mental illness, personal 
psychopathology, causal attributions for mental illness, perception of the dangerousness 
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of the mentally ill, and worldview. A specific style of viewing the world that has been 
shown to be related to mental illness stigma are the meritocratic worldviews. These are 
discussed next.  
Meritocratic Worldviews 
The worldviews held by both members of the general public and those held by 
individuals with mental illness provide insight into the process and persistence of mental 
illness stigma (Norman, Sorrentino, Windell, & Manchanda, 2008; Stier & Henshaw, 
2007; Yang et al., 2007). Worldviews, or belief systems that hold individuals as having 
personal responsibility for events and outcomes in their lives, have been consistently 
identified as correlates of stigma (Rusch et al., 2010a). Perhaps the most well known 
meritocratic worldview is the just world hypothesis, or the belief that people deserve, or 
earn, their outcomes in life (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). As such, negative circumstances 
may be seen to reflect a weakness of character or ability (Rusch et al., 2010a). Indeed, 
individuals who identify with meritocratic beliefs often attribute the onset of mental 
illness as being the fault of the afflicted individual (Crandall & Moriarty, 1995).  
One likely contributor to the prevalence of meritocratic views is the American 
interpretation of Christianity, in which there is a particularly strong focus on sinful 
behavior and its consequences. This emphasis on sin may have helped to perpetuate the 
frequent assignment of blame to individuals for their mental illness (Dain, 1992). As 
such, meritocratic worldviews with a basis in Christian belief may be of particular 
interest when mental illness stigma is considered within the culture of the United States. 
Thus, another well-known meritocratic worldview, the Protestant Work Ethic, bears 
further exploration. It is discussed here. 
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The Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) The Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) worldview 
places value on hard work, self-reliance, and individual problem solving. Success is seen 
as a result of resolve and personal application while unity, acceptance, and help seeking 
are deemphasized.  
The PWE worldview has been shown to be related to higher levels of psychiatric 
distress. Quinn and Crocker (1999) administered the Protestant Ethic Scale (a brief 
questionnaire assessing PWE orientation), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and 
measures of depression, anxiety, and Body Mass Index to 257 college women. Findings 
indicated that high identification with PWE values was related to substantially lower 
levels of psychological well being for individuals who were classified as “very 
overweight.” 
Other research has suggested that a reduction in PWE values may result in a 
decline of mental illness stigma (Norman et al., 2008). When considering personal values 
and mental illness stigma, self-transcendence values (values consistent with 
egalitarianism, benevolence, and universalism) were an independent predictor of a 
preference for reduced social distance from individuals with mental illness. In other 
words, beliefs opposite to those espoused by the PWE worldview predicted a greater 
preference for interaction with the mentally ill. As such, individuals who hold higher 
levels of PWE values may more strongly identify with stigmatic beliefs about the 
mentally ill.  
The PWE worldview was chosen to represent meritocratic worldviews in the 
present study. This choice was based on a number of factors including the recent use of 
the PWE worldview in the mental illness stigma literature (e.g., Rusch et al., 2010a), the 
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strong connection between the PWE and American Christianity and Western culture 
(Dain, 1992; Rosenthal, Levy, & Moyer, 2011) and the existence of an established 
methodology for experimental manipulation (Quinn & Crocker, 1999; Rusch et al., 
2010a).  
Summary. There is a strong connection between meritocratic worldviews and 
mental illness stigma. The PWE worldview is of particular interest when considering 
mental illness stigma within modern day American culture and is used as a representative 
of meritocratic belief systems in the present study. Different methods for measuring 
mental illness stigma will now be discussed. 
Measuring Mental Illness Stigma 
A typical way of examining mental illness stigma is by evaluating the attitudes 
that individuals hold toward mental illness. Attitude is defined here and common 
methods for measuring attitudes are presented with a focus on the measures utilized in the 
present research. 
An attitude is an individual’s preference or belief with regard to a certain object, 
construct, or group (Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991). Attitudes are pervasive and may vary in 
salience. They can be explicit or implicit, meaning that attitudes can be present in 
conscious awareness or may operate on the subconscious level (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). 
Thus, attitudes may be consciously identifiable or they may be activated automatically 
without conscious awareness or moderating cognition (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes, 1986). It is important to evaluate attitudes on both the conscious and 
subconscious levels as change to both explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes (and not 
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simply one or the other) are necessary to impart lasting reduction in stigma (Sritharan & 
Gawronski, 2010).  
Relationship Between Explicit and Implicit Attitudes. There is a complex 
relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes. Perhaps the most compelling 
description of the relationship is the Associative-Propositional Evaluation model (APE; 
Sritharan & Gawronski, 2010). 
 The APE presents explicit attitude evaluation and implicit attitude evaluation as 
fundamentally distinct processes. Implicit evaluations occur when relevant stimuli cause 
automatic affective reactions, involving very little cognitive volition (Sritharan & 
Gawronski, 2010). These evaluations can be activated whether an individual believes the 
evaluations to be accurate. Explicit evaluations are driven by propositional processes and 
are superordinate to, but reflective of, associative processes. Building from an affective 
reaction, propositional processes result in a proposition such as, “Blacks are dangerous 
and I should avoid them.” Unlike associative processes, however, propositional processes 
are dependent on values and reason. Broad and lasting attitude change, thus, may only be 
possible given changes on both the explicit and implicit level (Sritharan & Gawronski, 
2010). 
 The literature provides concrete data to support the assertion that the explicit and 
implicit attitude processes are fundamentally separate. A broad review of the IAT 
literature presented by Wittenbrink and Schwarz (2007) revealed a mean correlation of r  
= 0.19, indicating only a minor relationship. Typical methods of measuring explicit 
mental illness are now discussed. 
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Measuring Explicit Attitudes Toward Mental Illness. Attitudes toward mental 
illness have been measured by a number of explicit methods, meaning that the measures 
are self-evident and face valid. These have included self-report surveys, experimental 
manipulations, and qualitative research (see review by Link, Yang, Phelan, & Collins, 
2004).  
Most researchers have utilized self-report questionnaires to evaluate explicit 
stigma (Link et al., 2004). The most common variety of self-report questionnaires to 
measure explicit attitudes toward mental illness evaluate social distance, or the 
willingness to interact with individuals with mental illness. Utilized since the late 1950s 
(e.g., Whatley, 1959; Phillips, 1963), these measures typically show good reliability 
(Link et al., 2004). Social distance measures are strongly limited, however, by social 
desirability effects, as respondents may want to be seen as “enlightened and caring” (Link 
et al., 2004, p. 519). Additionally, social distance questionnaires tend to correlate poorly 
with actual behavior (Link et al., 2004). 
A number of other approaches to measuring explicit attitudes have been utilized. 
The semantic differential methodology examines the labeling behavior of participants 
(Nunnally & Kitross, 1958). Other methods have directly assessed evaluations of mental 
illness. The Opinions About Mental Illness (OMI; Cohen & Struening,1962) and the 
Community Attitudes Toward the Mentally Ill (CAMI; Taylor & Dear, 1981) measures 
have been commonly used (Link et al., 2004).  
 Several more recent measures of explicit attitudes toward mental illness have 
been based on Weiner’s (1986) work on attribution theory. Weiner argued that 
individuals have an affective response to stigmatizing attributes that (along with 
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perceived responsibility for the attributes) determines a behavioral response (e.g., anger 
leading to punishment or sympathy leading to helping behavior). Two of these types of 
explicit measures, Corrigan’s Attribution Questionnaire and his Self-Stigma of Mental 
Illness Scale, were utilized in the present research. 
The Attribution Questionnaire (AQ; Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, & 
Kubiak, 2003) builds on Weiner’s theory and has been widely used in various studies. 
The AQ utilized Weiner’s (1988) attribution measure as well as eleven items from 
Reisenzein’s (1986) measure. The AQ was designed to capture explicit attitudes about 
public mental illness stigma and requires participants to rate their agreement with 
statements about a fictional individual with a serious mental illness. The AQ evaluates 
nine negative stereotypic attitudes toward mental illness. These nine attitudes are the 
assignment of Blame to the mentally ill for their illness, Anger toward the mentally ill, 
Sympathy for individuals with mental illness, an (un)Willingness to Help those with 
mental illness, a perception of high Dangerousness of people with mental illness, Fear of 
mental illness, a desire for the Coercion of the mentally ill into receiving treatment, the 
Segregation of the mentally ill, and the Avoidance of individuals with mental illness. 
Several versions of the AQ have been created including a short form (AQ-9) and a 
version for children (AQ-C). The AQ has repeatedly been shown to have good internal 
consistency and construct validity (Corrigan et al., 2003; Link et al., 2004). 
The Self-Stigma of Mental Illness Scale (SSMIS; Corrigan, Watson, & Barr, 
2006) was designed to evaluate the attitudes related to the self-stigma of individuals with 
mental illness. The SSMIS includes four separate sections that evaluate the awareness of 
common stereotypes of mental illness, agreement with those stereotypes, self-application 
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of the stereotypes, and self-handicapping beliefs due to endorsement of the stereotypes. 
The SSMIS scales have shown acceptable internal consistency ( = 0.72-0.88) and test-
retest reliability ( = 0.68-0.82; Corrigan et al., 2006). 
Other attribution questionnaires that have been used to evaluate attitudes toward 
the mentally ill include the Revised Causal Dimension Scale (McAuley, Duncan, & 
Russell, 1992) and the Attitude to Mental Illness Questionnaire (Luty, Fekadu, Umoh, 
Gallagher, 2006). Both measures have good internal consistency and convergent validity 
(Link et al., 2004). 
In summary, a variety of explicit measures of mental illness stigma have been 
developed. They are all limited in that they are explicit, meaning that respondents can 
easily determine what they are measuring. This makes them open to social desirability 
effects. Fortunately, methods of measuring implicit attitudes have also been developed. 
Measuring Implicit Attitudes Toward Mental Illness. Explicit measures of 
attitudes are, by nature, direct and face valid as they seek to evaluate conscious beliefs. 
As discussed previously, this makes explicit methods highly susceptible to social 
desirability effects. Implicit measures, on the other hand, evaluate unconscious attitude 
structures. As these attitudes cannot be measured directly, indirect methods for evaluating 
these structures were developed. One of the major benefit of indirect methods are their 
resistance to social-desirability effects and faking. Some of the most popular methods for 
evaluating implicit attitudes are discussed below.  
Perhaps the most popular, and most scrutinized, measure of implicit attitudes is 
the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which was developed in the mid-1990s and refined 
throughout the early 2000s. The IAT evaluates the relationship between a target-concept 
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discrimination and an attribute dimension (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; 
Fazio & Olson, 2003).  
Target concepts are the broader objects, constructs, or groups of interest. The 
target concepts are generally split into two categories. For example, if racial attitudes are 
being studied, the target concepts might be White Americans/Black Americans. If ageism 
is of interest, the target concepts might be Young Adults/Elderly Adults. Within the 
mental illness stigma literature, researchers have frequently used IATs with Physical 
Illness/Mental Illness as target concepts. 
The attribute dimension represents the attitude being evaluated. Like the target 
concept, the attribute dimension is divided into two categories. These categories are 
generally valenced with some classic examples of divided attribute dimensions being 
Pleasant/Unpleasant, Good/Bad, Competent/Helpless, and Innocent/Guilty (particularly 
in literature considering implicit attitudes toward mental illness). 
Traditional IAT protocols utilize seven experimental blocks that are administered 
via computer. These protocols begin with an attribute dimension block in which 
participants group stimuli that recognizably belong to one of the two categories of the 
attribute dimension. For example, “Vacation” and “Vomit” might be stimuli in an IAT 
using Good/Bad as an attribute dimension. Each category is assigned to either the left 
hand or right hand, so that one button on a keyboard (e.g., the “e” key) is pressed by the 
left hand to categorize a stimulus into one of the target concept categories, while another 
button (e.g., the “i" key) is pressed by the right hand to categorize a stimulus into the 
other target concept category. 
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Next, participants complete a target-concept discrimination block in which they 
group stimuli that recognizably belong to one of the two categories of the target concept. 
For example, “Schizophrenia” and “Influenza” might be stimuli in an IAT using Physical 
Illness/Mental Illness as a target concept. Schizophrenia would be categorized as Mental 
Illness while Influenza would be categorized as Physical Illness.  
After the initial target-concept discrimination block has been completed, 
participants complete a third block in which categories and stimuli from both the target-
concept discrimination block and the attribute dimension block are superimposed. For 
example, in an IAT using Physical Illness/Mental Illness as a target concept and 
Good/Bad as an attribute dimension, categories might be combined so that Good stimuli 
and Physical Illness stimuli would be categorized together using the left hand key and 
Bad stimuli and Mental Illness stimuli would be categorized together using the right hand 
key. The fourth block is identical with a greater number of trials.  
In the fifth block, participants complete another attribute dimension task. This 
block is identical to the first block except the original response assignments are reversed 
so that the category that was originally assigned to the left hand is now assigned to the 
right hand and vice versa.  
In the sixth block, target-concept and attribute dimension categories are again 
combined, with the reversed attribute dimension assignments, so that each target-concept 
category is paired with the opposite attribute dimension. Using the former Physical 
Illness/Mental Illness/Good/Bad example, if Physical Illness was previously paired with 
Good then it would now be paired with Bad and vice versa. Block 7 is identical but with 
a greater number of trials. See Figure 1 for an example design of a Mental 
 17 
Illness/Physical Illness Good/Bad IAT. See Figure 2 for examples of screen captures 
from each block of the same IAT.  
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Figure 1 
 
Design of a Good/Bad Mental Illness/Physical Illness IAT (adapted from Wittenbrink & 
Schwarz, 2007) 
 
Block Left Key Assignment Right Key Assignment 
1 Good Bad 
2 Mental Illness Physical Illness 
3 Good 
Mental Illness 
Bad 
Physical Illness 
4 Good  
Mental Illness 
Bad 
Physical Illness 
5 Bad Good 
6 Bad 
Mental Illness 
Good 
Physical Illness 
7 Bad 
Mental Illness 
Good 
Physical Illness 
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                            Block 1      Block 2             Block 3/4 
                                      Block 5             Block 6/7  
Figure 2 
 
Example Screen Selections from Each Block of Good/Bad Mental Illness/Physical Illness IAT  
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 The IAT has been used to evaluate many types of implicit attitudes. Perhaps the 
most frequently evaluated are racial attitudes. Many studies (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998) 
have examined preference for either Black Americans or White Americans using stimuli 
such as traditional black or white names, or pictures of black or white faces. Some other 
broad categories of implicit attitudes that have been examined include religious 
affiliation, tobacco use, vegetarianism, sexual orientation, gender and mathematical 
ability, and aging (Fazio et al., 2003). Typically, results reveal a preference for the non-
stereotyped group (Fazio et al., 2003).  
The IAT has been shown to be unaffected by handedness, number of stimuli, or 
by the inter-trial interval (Greenwald et al., 1998). Additionally, the IAT effect is mainly 
unaffected by the way in which incorrect responses are treated (e.g., whether discarded or 
penalized; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). Initial research also suggested that the IAT is not 
affected by the degree to which stimuli and categories are familiar to the participant 
(Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000). Internal consistency is reportedly 
acceptable (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001) as is convergent validity (Cunningham, 
Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; Greenwald et al., 2001). When 
considering the discriminant validity of the IAT, self-report measures of explicit attitudes 
are most often used. A slightly positive relationship between self-report measures and the 
IAT has been found, as would be hypothesized given good discriminant validity (Bosson, 
Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Depending on the attitudes 
being evaluated, however, the relationship between IAT data and self-report data can 
vary greatly in magnitude, while remaining consistently positive (Nosek, Banaji, & 
Greenwald, 2002). 
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A procedural order effect has been noted for IAT protocols. Associations between 
the target concepts and attribute dimensions paired in the first combined task tend to 
persist and interfere with performance on the second combined task due to a mild practice 
effect (Nosek et al., 2002). This potential confound can, however, be easily avoided 
through the use of counterbalancing pairing order. 
IAT performance is difficult for participants to manipulate or suppress. 
Participants who were instructed to respond with a lack of automatic preference for 
Whites in an IAT to evaluate racial attitudes were unable to do so (Kim & Greenwald, 
1998). These findings were replicated in a study using heterosexual participants 
instructed to fake positive implicit attitudes toward homosexuality (Banse et al., 2001). 
The IAT, as originally designed, is evaluated through the calculation of a “D-
score” (a related, but not identical, measure of effect-size to Cohen’s d) based on the 
difference between the standardized mean response latency between target-concept and 
attribute pairings. The magnitude of the D-score represents the degree of association 
strength. In 2003, Greenwald and colleagues refined the calculation of D and described 
the procedure in detail. To summarize the calculation, the updated D-score is the 
difference in mean response latency between an IAT's two combined tasks divided by the 
inclusive standard deviation of response latencies within the two combined tasks 
(Wittenbrink & Scwarz, 2007). 
Sriram and Greenwald (2009) created an abbreviated version of the IAT, with the 
primary goal of simplifying instructions and reducing overall task length. This version is 
known as the Brief Implicit Association Test (BIAT). The general format and theory of 
the BIAT and IAT are consistent with two notable differences. The first difference is the 
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number of trials, with the BIAT using one-third of the trials utilized by the traditional 
IAT. Secondly, participants are instructed to focus solely on one attribute dimension and 
one target concept during the paired categorization blocks.  
The BIAT was consistent with the IAT for ageist, racist, and gender-related 
stereotypes (Sriram et al., 2009). Additionally, the procedural ordering effect noted for 
the IAT was observed to a lesser degree on the BIAT. Attempts at a direct comparison 
between the BIAT and IAT indicated small differences in test/retest performance. Minor 
disparities were also noted in the relationship between IAT and BIAT scores and 
participant responses on explicit attitude measures. Acceptable test-retest reliability and 
good internal consistency has also been established for BIATs evaluating several 
different types of attitudes (Sriram et al., 2009).  
Aside from the IAT, a number of other methods to indirectly measure implicit 
attitudes have been developed. These include priming tasks, the Extrinsic Affective 
Simon Task, the Affect Misattribution Procedure, the Go/No-go Association Task, and 
non-computerized methods. These are briefly discussed here. 
Some of the first indirect measures of attitudes were sequential priming tasks and 
these methods continue to be a popular way of assessing implicit attitudes. Priming tasks 
take advantage of cognitive processing theory in that primes (e.g., “doctor”) will activate 
and aid in the retrieval of related concepts (e.g., “nurse”; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). 
Wittenbrink and Schwarz (2007) outlined priming tasks in two categories, Concept 
priming tasks and Evaluative priming tasks. Concept priming tasks typically involve 
completing a lexical decision task (LDT; i.e., deciding whether a stimulus is a word or a 
non-word) following a prime (e.g., Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Evaluative priming 
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tasks are nearly identical to concept priming tasks with a few exceptions. First, target 
words are judged by valence (e.g., pleasant and unpleasant, good and bad, attractive and 
unattractive) instead of a LDT. Secondly, target words are primarily unrelated to the 
prime (e.g., “Black” as a prime and “Vacation” as a target; Fazio et al., 1986). Like the 
IAT, priming methods use latency to determine association strength.  
Priming tasks have a number of strengths including resistance to faking and 
strong convergent validity (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). However, priming protocols 
are relatively complex when compared with some of the other measures of implicit 
attitudes and are, thus, more difficult to administer. Also, priming tasks may be less 
reliable than other indirect measures and may generate relatively small effect sizes 
(Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). 
The Extrinsic Affective Simon task (EAST) was introduced by De Houwer 
(2003). The EAST is similar to the IAT in that stimulus words are categorized by two 
separate dimensions. In a typical EAST task, stimuli are presented in the colors white, 
blue, or green in the center of a computer screen. Participants are tasked with 
categorizing these stimuli by pressing one of two keys. When the stimulus word is 
colored white, participants are instructed to categorize by the valence of the word. This is 
accomplished by pressing a key for positive white words or a different key for negative 
white words. Due to the nature of this process, the key assigned to positive valence 
categorizations becomes associated with positivity while the other key becomes 
associated with negative valence. When the stimulus word is colored blue or green, 
participants are instructed to categorize the stimulus simply by its color. For this 
categorization, one key is assigned to the blue color while the other key is assigned to be 
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green color. The EAST effect appears when participants show increased latency in 
response when categorizing colored words after the initial categorization by valence. The 
internal consistency of the EAST was acceptable with alphas ranging from 0.70 to 0.83. 
The task can be considered appropriate for the assessment of individual differences in 
prejudice (Degner & Wentura, 2008). Although the EAST has been shown to be effective 
in evaluating implicit attitudes, the IAT is more effective in determining inter-individual 
differences in implicit attitudes (DeHouwer & DeBruycker, 2007).  
The Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, Stewart, 
2005) is a variation on the priming methodology. Participants are instructed to rate a 
neutral target (e.g., a Chinese symbol) as either pleasant or unpleasant. Participants 
receive a brief (75 millisecond) “warning” stimulus, which served as a prime, prior to 
being presented with the target. Prime stimuli are either the attitude object being studied 
(e.g., pictures of Black faces and pictures of White faces) or a neutral stimulus (e.g., a 
patterned background). The positive or negative reaction of participants to the prime is 
misattributed to the neutral target. Thus, rating scores are assumed to represent positive 
or negative implicit attitudes toward the primes (Payne et al., 2005). AMP procedures 
have good internal and construct validity and are highly reliable. Similar to the IAT, the 
AMP consistently generates relatively large effect sizes compared to many other 
measures of implicit cognition (Payne et al., 2005). 
Like the IAT, the Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001) 
examines the strength of association between target categories and attributes. Unlike the 
IAT, however, the GNAT is establishes association strength without the use of 
contrasting categories (Nosek et al., 2001). The GNAT presents stimuli that serve as 
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either targets or distractors. Targets and distractors may be an attitude object (e.g., 
“White American”) or a valenced attribute or concept (e.g., “Nasty”). Participants are 
instructed to respond using a singular key if the presented stimulus is a target and to 
inhibit responding when the stimulus is a distractor. Target categories are defined at the 
onset of each block. Instead of using response latency to measure preference, the GNAT 
utilizes accuracy (sensitivity). Construct and convergent validity of the GNAT is 
acceptable (Nosek et al., 2006). 
While response latency methodologies are the most popular way of indirectly 
measuring attitudes, non-computerized and physiological measures are occasionally used. 
Word fragment completion (WFC) tasks require participants to complete a series of 
fragmented words within the context of measuring stereotype activation (Wittenbrink & 
Schwarz, 2007). The Stereotypic Explanatory Bias (SEB) task requires completers to 
observe and explain behaviors that are either consistent or inconsistent with stereotypes. 
Scores are based on the number of explanations provided (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007;!
Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, and von Hippel, 2003). Further, 
physiological methods, including event-related potentials (ERP) and function magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) have been used increasingly to evaluate implicit attitudes 
(Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). 
Summary. Methods to measure explicit attitudes are generally self-report 
questionnaires that evaluate attitudes, most often in a face-valid fashion, and may be 
subject to social desirability confounds. Social distance questionnaires have been 
amongst the most historically popular method to measure explicit attitudes toward mental 
illness, but more recently developed measures have utilized attributional theories of 
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stigma. Some established methods of measuring implicit attitudes include the IAT, 
priming measures, the EAST, the GNAT, and the AMP. New physiological measures of 
implicit attitudes are also being developed and utilized. Of these, the IAT and its 
derivatives are most frequently used. The BIAT method was chosen to measure implicit 
attitudes in the present research. 
Current Study 
The present study examined the role of the PWE meritocratic worldview in 
mental illness stigma. To be specific, this study sought to establish a causal link between 
mental illness stigma and PWE by manipulating the latter and measuring stigma on the 
explicit and implicit levels.  
The study has three main hypotheses. 
1) Individuals in the High PWE group will exhibit more implicit mental illness 
stigma than individuals receiving the Low PWE manipulation. 
2) Individuals in the High PWE group will exhibit more explicit mental illness 
stigma than individuals receiving the Low PWE manipulation. 
3) Participants’ level of contact with the mentally ill will be negatively related to 
their implicit and explicit scores of mental illness stigma. 
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Method 
 
 
Participants 
Participants included 290 Marquette University students enrolled in a general 
psychology course. Of these participants, 18 were removed from analysis due to errors in 
responding. Participants were required to enter their assigned participants numbers on 
two separate occasions and, if the numbers entered were not consistent, it was impossible 
to match participants with their data. Thus, 272 participants were considered in analyses. 
Participants completed the entire protocol in one sitting and received course credit for 
their participation. Please see Table 1 for demographic details of the sample. ! !
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Table 1 
 
Participant Characteristics 
 
 
Characteristic 
 
 
n 
 
% 
 
Gender 
  
     Male 71 26.1 
     Female 201 73.9 
   
Race/Ethnicity   
     White 212 77.9 
     Black/African American 11 4.0 
     American Indian/Alaskan Native 2 0.7 
     Asian 20 7.4 
     Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander 2 0.7 
     Other 25 9.2 
   
Class Standing   
     Freshman 138 50.7 
     Sophomore 61 22.4 
     Junior 41 15.1 
     Senior 32 11.8 
   
History of Psychiatric Treatment   
     No 215 79.0 
     Yes 57 21.0 
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Materials 
The participants completed the study protocol in a computer laboratory on the 
campus of Marquette University with a trained undergraduate research assistant. 
Individuals completed the study in groups that consisted of eight or fewer participants. 
Administration occurred electronically, with a portion of study materials hosted online by 
Opinio (ObjectPlanet, 2012) and a portion hosted by Inquisit (Millisecond Software, 
2012), a popular stimulus presentation software package frequently used in IAT studies.  
Experimental Manipulation. The experimental manipulation was adapted from 
Quinn and Crocker (1999). Participants read one of two “political speech” primes that 
either focused on values consistent with the PWE (e.g., hard work, self-determination, 
personal achievement, and personal responsibility) or on values inconsistent with the 
PWE (e.g., unity, acceptance, and openness to help). The primes used were identical to 
those used by Quinn and Crocker (1999). 
A brief questionnaire was administered to participants directly after they read 
their assigned speech. Participants were asked to summarize the message of the speech in 
one sentence. Additionally, participants rated the perceived degree of power of the speech 
on a scale ranging from 1 (extremely weak) to 7 (extremely powerful) for each of three 
domains: overall Speech Power, Speech Content, and Speech Message. The questionnaire 
was intended to serve four important purposes. First, it was intended to increase the 
salience of the speeches. Second, it was intended to provide a measurement of the actual 
salience of the speeches. Third, the questionnaire was intended to hide the true intent of 
the manipulation. Finally, the questionnaire served as part of the manipulation check. 
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This methodology was consistent with that established by Quinn and Crocker (1999) with 
minor modification. The Speeches and Questionnaire are located in Appendix A. 
Demographics Questionnaire. Participants were administered a brief 
demographics questionnaire. The questionnaire included prompts for basic demographic 
information, as well as self-report questions related to religious affiliation, psychiatric 
treatment history and satisfaction, and interest in the mental health field.  
Measures of Explicit Attitudes Toward Mental Illness. A modified version of the 
AQ (Corrigan et al., 2003) was administered to assess explicit stereotypes of mental 
illness. The AQ requires participants to rate their agreement with statements about a 
fictional individual with schizophrenia (“Harry”) who is experiencing emotional and 
functional difficulties due to his disorder on a nine-point Likert scale. Consistency and 
test-retest reliability of AQ have been established as acceptable (Corrigan et al., 2003).  
The original AQ evaluates nine stereotypes as discussed previously. 
The AQ was modified using a sample of Marquette University students (Saunders, 2013). 
Specifically, the Segregation scale had poor discriminant validity and was removed from 
analysis. Additionally, the Anger scale was split into two separate scales, Anger at Person 
and Anger at Condition. See Appendix B for the complete measure. 
For the present study, internal consistency varied from scale to scale. Most scales 
had acceptable internal consistency including Sympathy (3 items,  = 0.79), Anger at 
Person (3 items,  = 0.78), Dangerousness (3 items,  = 0.89), Fear (4 items,  = 
0.91), Willingness to Help (3 items,  = 0.82), Coercion (4 items,  = 0.77), and 
Avoidance (4 items,  = 0.74). Two scales had questionable internal consistency, 
including Responsibility (4 items,  = 0.60) and Anger at Condition (3 items,  = 
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0.67), despite having been previously noted to be acceptable ( = 0.82 and  = 0.78, 
respectively; Saunders, 2013). Due to the importance of the Responsibility and Anger at 
Condition scales to the current research, these scales were still utilized in analyses. 
Participants also completed the first two sections of the SSMIS (Corrigan et al., 
2006). The first section is Stereotype Awareness and evaluates the degree to which 
participants are knowledgeable of common stereotypes of the mentally ill. Participants 
are asked to rate the degree to which they believe that the general public agrees with a 
series of ten of these common stereotypes on a nine-point Likert scale. The second 
section of the SSMIS is Stereotype Agreement and evaluates the degree to which 
participants agree with the same ten stereotypes presented in the Stereotype Awareness 
section. The SSMIS has shown acceptable internal consistency and test-retest reliability 
(Corrigan et al., 2006). The present study observed strong alpha values for each section (
 = 0.95 and  = 0.92, respectively). 
Measures of Implicit Attitudes Toward Mental Illness. Three BIATs were 
administered to each participant in order to evaluate three domains of implicit attitudes 
toward mental illness. For each of the BIATs, Mental Illness and Physical Illness were 
used as target categories. For the first BIAT (Good/Bad), Good and Bad were used as 
attribute categories with the intention of measuring a general degree of implicit mental 
illness stigma. Innocent and Blameworthy were used as attribute categories for the 
second BIAT (Innocent/Blameworthy), with the goal of measuring blame-related implicit 
stereotypes of mental illness. For the third BIAT (Competent/Helpless), Competent and 
Helpless were used as attribute categories, with the intention of measuring helplessness-
related stereotypes of mental illness. General negativity, blameworthiness, and 
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helplessness were evaluated for two reasons. First, these are typical domains of 
stereotype toward the mentally ill (e.g., Byrne, 2000; Corrigan, Kuwabara, & 
O’Shaughnessy, 2009). Second, IATs evaluating these three categories of implicit 
stereotype were successfully utilized in a previous study (Teachman et al., 2006) from 
which the stimuli utilized in the present study were acquired. The stimuli were pretested 
and matched for salience by Teachman and colleagues (2006). The stimuli are included in 
Appendix C. This basic methodology was adapted from Rusch and colleagues (2010a) 
and the BIAT stimuli were adapted from Teachman and colleagues (2006).  
A single sample t-test was used to compare mean D-scores for each BIAT with 
zero in order to establish the existence and direction of an IAT effect. The Good/Bad [M 
= 0.25, SD = 0.34; t(271) = 12.42, p < 0.001], Innocent/Blameworthy [M= 0.06, SD = 
0.36; t(271) = 2.72, p = 0.007], and Competent/Helpless [M = 0.09, SD = 0.32; t(271) = 
4.44, p < 0.001] were all significantly different from zero and in the expected direction 
(indicating implicitly held stereotypes against mental illness). Mean D-scores on the 
Good/Bad BIAT (0.25) were comparable with the median D-score (0.33) from a large 
sample of typical IAT scores (N = 2,575,535) reported by Greenwald and colleagues 
(2003). These findings suggest that the BIATs were effective in identifying implicit 
stigma amongst study participants, particularly when general implicit mental illness was 
considered. 
Measure of Protestant Work Ethic Values. The Protestant Ethic Scale (PWE 
Scale; Katz & Hass, 1988) measures values consistent with the PWE and was used as a 
manipulation check. The PWE Scale is an 11-item measure extracted from the 19-item 
scale of Mirels and Garrett (1971). The PWE Scale is noted to have acceptable internal 
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consistency ( = .76; Katz et al., 1988). The scale has also shown acceptable 
discriminant validity when compared to a 20-item measure of humanitarian-egalitarian 
worldview (r = .83; Katz et al., 1988). The present research observed acceptable internal 
consistency for the PWE Scale ( = 0.73). The full measure is included in Appendix D. 
Measure of Familiarity with Mental Illness. The Level of Contact Report 
(Holmes, Corrigan, Williams, Canar, & Kubiak, 1999) was administered to evaluate 
participants’ level of familiarity with mental illness. The Level of Contact Report is a 
rating scale in which participants select any of 12 statements describing lifetime 
familiarity with mental illness. Each of the 12 statements were rank-ordered by mental 
health experts by degree of contact. Interrater reliability between the raters was 
acceptable ( = 0.83; Holmes et al., 1999). The rank-order of the highest selected 
statement denotes a participant’s score. For example, if a respondent endorses the highest 
ranked statement (“I have a severe mental illness”) then the participant would receive a 
score of twelve. See Appendix E for the full instrument.  
Measures of Mental Health. For the purposes of evaluating the composition of 
the sample, measures of psychiatric well-being were administered. The Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale was used to measure the evaluations of each participant’s overall self-
esteem. The scale consists of 10 items rated for agreement, with higher scores indicating 
a greater amount of self-esteem. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale has been shown to 
have good test-retest reliability as well as acceptable construct validity (Robinson & 
Shaver, 1973). Internal consistency was excellent in the current study ( = 0.90). 
Participants also completed the Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation 
Outcome Measure (CORE-OM). The CORE-OM (Barkham et al., 1998) is a 34-item 
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measure that evaluates current psychiatric symptoms. It is pan-theoretical and pan-
diagnostic. The items cover four domains: Well-being (4 items), Problems/Symptoms (12 
items), Life Functioning (12 items), and Risk (6 items). Each item is rated on a 5-point 
scale ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 4 (Most or all the time). Examinations of the 
psychometric properties of the CORE-OM report acceptable ranges of internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability ( = 0.75 and  = 0.95, respectively) and good 
convergent validity (Cahill et al., 2006). Confirmatory factor analysis supports the 
structural model of the four scales (Lyne, Barrett, Evan, & Barkham, 2006).  
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited through flyers distributed at Marquette University. 
Participation included completing the protocol in one group data collection session in a 
university computer laboratory. A trained undergraduate research assistant instructed 
participants on how to access the study materials online. Participation took less than 90 
minutes. 
 The research protocol was as follows. First, participants agreed to the informed 
consent and completed the demographics questionnaire. Next, they were administered the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Questionnaire and the CORE-OM. Participants then received 
either the High PWE or Low PWE manipulation and completed the Speech 
Questionnaire. Next, participants were administered the explicit and implicit stigma 
measures. The order in which these measures were completed was counterbalanced so 
that some participants were administered the three BIATs first while others completed the 
AQ and SSMIS questionnaires first. Participants always completed the BIATs in the 
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following order: Good/Bad, Innocent/Blameworthy, and Competent/Helpless. Likewise, 
all participants first completed the AQ and then the SSMIS.  
Following the completion of the implicit and explicit stigma measures, 
participants were administered the PWE Scale (as a manipulation check) and Level of 
Contact Report. Finally, participants received a debriefing form. 
Analyses 
Descriptive Analyses. Descriptive statistics were calculated for each measure. 
Small differences in scores on the stigma measures due to psychiatric distress and 
familiarity with mental illness were anticipated based on prior literature (e.g., Rusch et 
al., 2010a; Teachman, Wilson, & Komarovskaya, 2006). Descriptive statistics are 
presented by overall sample and demographic factors. Additionally, descriptive statistics 
were used to determine covariates for group comparisons and post-hoc analyses. 
Evaluation of the Hypotheses. The hypotheses were evaluated using traditional 
null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). As a first step, relationships between 
variables were calculated and covariates were identified for the multivariate analyses. 
 Hypothesis one, that individuals receiving the High PWE manipulation would 
show a greater degree of implicit mental illness stigma when compared with individuals 
receiving the Low PWE manipulation, was tested using a Multivariate Analysis of 
Covariance (MANCOVA).  
Hypothesis two, that individuals receiving the High PWE manipulation would 
show a greater degree of explicit mental illness stigma when compared with individuals 
receiving the Low PWE manipulation, was tested using two MANCOVAs. One 
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MANCOVA was conducted to evaluate differences on the two SSMIS measures. Another 
MANCOVA evaluated group differences on AQ scale scores.  
Hypothesis three, that participants’ level of contact with the mentally ill would be 
negatively related to their implicit and explicit scores of mental illness stigma, was 
assessed using multiple regression analyses. 
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Results 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 In this section, descriptive statistics are presented for each measure. Tests were 
conducted to determine if scores varied on several demographic factors including gender, 
race and ethnicity (defined in this section as White or Non-White for the sake of 
statistical power), and history of psychiatric treatment.  
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. Scores on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
ranged from 6 to 24. Descriptive Statistics for the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale by 
overall sample and by demographic factors are presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics for Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, CORE-OM, PWE Scale, and 
Level of Contact Report by Characteristic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristic Rosenberg 
Total M (SD) 
CORE-OM 
Total M 
(SD) 
PWE Scale 
M (SD) 
Level of 
Contact M 
(SD) 
Total Sample 18.82 (3.31) 1.10 (0.52) 48.55 (8.73) 7.72 (3.04) 
     
Gender     
   Male 18.90 (3.04) 1.26 (0.53) 50.44 (9.36) 7.77 (3.15) 
   Female 18.79 (3.40) 1.04 (0.50) 47.89 (8.42) 7.70 (3.01) 
     
Race/Ethnicity     
   White 18.87 (3.33) 1.09 (0.52) 48.11 (8.78) 7.86 (3.01) 
   Non-White 18.63 (3.23) 1.17 (0.52) 50.12 (8.44) 3.53 (1.45) 
     
Psychiatric 
Treatment 
    
   Yes 19.11 (3.01) 1.05 (0.51) 48.47 (8.61) 3.10 (1.30) 
   No 17.74 (4.08) 1.31 (0.51) 48.88 (9.22) 3.40 (1.45) 
39 
Of the total sample, 39 participants (14.34%) recorded total scores of 15 or below, 
indicating low self-esteem. There were no differences in Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
scores based on gender [t(270) = 2.41, p = 0.810] or race/ethnicity [t(270) = 0.49, p = 
0.622]. Participants with a psychiatric treatment history scored lower on the Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale than those without [t(72.98) = 2.37, p = 0.021]. 
CORE-OM. Mean total scores on the CORE-OM ranged from 0.24 to 3.00. 
Descriptive Statistics for the CORE-OM by overall sample and by demographic factors 
are presented in Table 2. 
Men recorded higher CORE-OM scores than women [t(270) = 2.92, p = 0.004]. 
There were no differences in CORE-OM scores based on race/ethnicity [t(270) = -1.11, p 
= 0.270]. Participants with a psychiatric treatment history scored higher on the CORE-
OM than those without [t(270) = -3.47, p = 0.001]. 
The norms presented in the Core Systems User Manual (Core Systems Team, 
1998) report an all-item mean score of 0.76 (SD = 0.59, N = 1084) for a non-clinical 
college student sample. The participants in the current sample scored significantly higher 
[t(1354) = 8.69, p < 0.001]. This difference remained significant even when participants 
with a treatment history and low self-esteem (Rosenberg score less than 15) were 
removed from consideration [t(1279) = 4.77, p < 0.001]. These findings indicate that the 
sample as a whole experienced more psychiatric symptoms than would have been 
expected from non-clinical college students. 
PWE Scale. Scores on the PWE Scale ranged from 11 to 74. Descriptive 
Statistics for the PWE Scale by overall sample and by demographic factors are presented 
in Table 2. 
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Men recorded higher PWE Scale scores than women [t(270) = 2.13, p = 0.034], 
but there were no differences in PWE scores based on race/ethnicity [t(270) = -1.58, p = 
0.116] or psychiatric treatment history [t(270) = -0.32, p = 0.752]. 
The PWE scores reported in the current study were roughly consistent with those 
recorded by 116 “normal weight” participants (those with no weight concerns) in the 
Quinn and Crocker study (1999; M = 46.75, SD = 7.15). The current scores are also 
roughly consistent with transformed PWE scores reported by Mirels and Garrett (1971; N 
= 81, M = 58.86, SD = 10.84) and Feather (1984; N = 116, M = 56.57, SD = 9.05). As 
such, the PWE scores for the overall sample were considered to fall within the expected 
range. 
Level of Contact Report. Scores on the Level of Contact Report ranged from 1 
to 12. Descriptive Statistics for the Level of Contact Report by overall sample and by 
demographic factors are presented in Table 2. 
Participants with a psychiatric treatment history reported a higher level of contact 
with mental illness [t(93.31) = -2.11, p = 0.037]. There were no difference in Level of 
Contact Report scores based on gender [t(270) = 0.19, p = 0.853] or race/ethnicity [t(270) 
= 1.49, p = 0.136].  
AQ Scales. Descriptive Statistics for the AQ scales by overall sample and by 
demographic factors are presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3  
 
Descriptive Statistics for AQ Scales by Characteristic
 
Characteristic 
AQ 
Responsibility 
M (SD) 
AQ Sympathy 
M (SD) 
AQ Anger at 
Person M 
(SD) 
AQ Anger at 
Condition M 
(SD) 
AQ 
Dangerousness 
M (SD) 
AQ Fear M 
(SD) 
AQ Willingness 
to Help M (SD) 
 
AQ 
Coercion M 
(SD) 
AQ 
Avoidance 
M (SD) 
Total Sample 3.17 (1.34) 7.01 (1.50) 2.27 (1.28) 3.31 (1.60) 2.91 (1.54) 2.66 (1.55) 2.66 (1.54) 4.98 (1.64) 3.60 (1.55) 
          
Gender          
   Male 3.57 (1.45) 6.77 (1.70) 2.55 (1.30) 3.40 (1.54) 3.34 (1.69) 3.00 (1.62) 3.09 (1.61) 4.82 (1.57) 3.88 (1.59) 
   Female 3.02 (1.27) 7.10 (1.42) 2.17 (1.22) 3.27 (1.62) 2.76 (1.45) 2.55 (1.51) 2.51 (1.50) 5.03 (1.67) 3.50 (1.53) 
          
Race/Ethnicity          
   White 3.06 (1.29) 7.09 (1.45) 2.24 (1.25) 3.33 (1.61) 2.85 (1.51) 2.63 (1.53) 2.67 (1.49) 4.89 (1.57) 3.56 (1.50) 
   Non-White 3.53 (1.45) 6.73 (1.64) 2.38 (1.39) 3.21 (1.56) 3.11 (1.61) 2.74 (1.64) 2.62 (1.75) 5.26 (1.86) 3.73 (1.72) 
          
Psychiatric           
Treatment 
         
   Yes 3.10 (1.30) 7.05 (1.39) 2.31 (1.28) 3.33 (1.62) 2.95 (1.56) 2.71 (1.59) 2.68 (1.45) 5.06 (1.53) 3.63 (1.44) 
   No 3.40 (1.45) 6.86 (1.86) 2.12 (1.26) 3.21 (1.54) 2.80 (1.45) 2.47 (1.39) 2.60 (1.86) 4.67 (1.99) 3.48 (1.92) 
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Men scored higher on the Responsibility [t(270) = 3.00, p = 0.003], Anger at 
Person [t(270) = 2.14, p = 0.033], Dangerousness [t(270) = 2.77, p = 0.006], Fear [t(270) 
= 2.12, p = 0.035], and Willingness to Help [t(270) = 2.72, p = 0.007] scales than women. 
There were no difference between genders on the Sympathy [t(270) = -1.56, p = 0.119], 
Anger at Condition [t(270) = 0.60, p = 0.547], Coercion [t(270) = -0.91, p = 0.0.361], or 
Avoidance [t(270) = 1.81, p = 0.071] scales. 
Non-white participants scored higher than white participants on the Responsibility 
scale [t(270) = -2.44, p = 0.015]. There were no differences on the Sympathy [t(270) = 
1.64, p = 0.102], Anger at Person [t(270) = -0.73, p = 0.469], Anger at Condition [t(270) 
= 0.55, p = 0.586], Dangerousness [t(270) = -1.12, p = 0.262], Fear [t(270) = -0.42, p = 
0.677], Willingness to Help [t(270) = 0.26, p = 0.798], Coercion [t(270) = -1.53, p = 
0.127], or Avoidance [t(270) = -0.74, p = 0.458] scales. 
There were no differences based on psychiatric treatment history on any of the 
AQ scales, including Responsibility [t(270) = -1.52, p = 0.129], Sympathy [t(73.51) = 
0.74, p = 0.463], Anger at Person [t(270) = 1.03, p = 0.304], Anger at Condition [t(270) = 
0.53, p = 0.595], Dangerousness [t(270) = 0.66, p = 0.512], Fear [t(270) = 1.02, p = 
0.311], Willingness to Help [t(75.06) = 0.31, p = 0.757], Coercion [t(74.53) = 1.37, p = 
0.176], and Avoidance [t(73.47) = 0.56, p = 0.581].  
SSMIS Stereotype Awareness and Stereotype Agreement. Scores on the 
SSMIS Stereotype Awareness ranged from 10 to 80. Scores on the SSMIS Stereotype 
Agreement ranged from 10 to 90. Descriptive Statistics for SSMIS Stereotype Awareness 
and SSMIS Stereotype Agreement scales by overall sample and by demographic factors 
are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4  
 
Descriptive Statistics for SSMIS Stereotype Agreement and Awareness and BIATs by 
Characteristic 
Characteristic SSMIS 
Stereotype 
Awareness 
M (SD) 
SSMIS 
Stereotype 
Agreement 
M (SD) 
BIAT 
Good/Bad 
M (SD) 
BIAT Innocent/ 
Blameworthy M 
(SD) 
BIAT 
Competent/ 
Helpless M 
(SD) 
Total Sample 53.84 (21.39) 28.30 (13.95) 0.25 (0.34) 0.06 (0.36) 0.09 (0.32) 
      
Gender      
   Male 18.90 (3.04) 1.26 (0.53) 50.44 (9.36) 7.77 (3.15) 0.11 (0.31) 
   Female 18.79 (3.40) 1.04 (0.50) 47.89 (8.42) 7.70 (3.01) 0.08 (0.32) 
      
Race/Ethnicity      
   White 18.87 (3.33) 1.09 (0.52) 48.11 (8.78) 7.86 (3.01) 0.08 (0.31) 
   Non-White 18.63 (3.23) 1.17 (0.52) 50.12 (8.44) 3.53 (1.45) 0.10 (0.34) 
      
Psychiatric 
Treatment 
     
   Yes 19.11 (3.01) 1.05 (0.51) 48.47 (8.61) 3.10 (1.30) 0.08 (0.31) 
   No 17.74 (4.08) 1.31 (0.51) 48.88 (9.22) 3.40 (1.45) 0.09 (0.35) 
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Women scored higher on the SSMIS Stereotype Awareness [t(270) = -2.27, p = 
0.024], whereas men scored higher on the SSMIS Stereotype Agreement [t(270) = 2.52, p 
= 0.012]. There were no significant differences in SSMIS Stereotype Awareness [t(270) 
= 1.17, p = 0.245] or SSMIS Stereotype Agreement [t(270) = -1.77, p = 0.078] based on 
race/ethnicity. There were also no differences in SSMIS Stereotype Awareness [t(270) = 
0.21, p = 0.836] or SSMIS Stereotype Agreement [t(74.05) = -0.55, p = 0.587] based on 
psychiatric treatment history. 
BIATs. Scores on the Good/Bad BIAT ranged from -1.08 to 0.95. Scores on the 
Innocent/Blameworthy BIAT ranged from -0.96 to 0.94. Scores on the 
Competent/Helpless BIAT ranged from -1.05 to 0.85. Descriptive Statistics for the 
BIATs by overall sample and by demographic factors are presented in Table 4. 
There were no gender differences on the Good/Bad BIAT [t(270) = 1.05, p = 
0.296], Innocent/Blameworthy BIAT [t(270) = -0.30, p = 0.769], or Competent/Helpless 
BIAT [t(270) = -0.67, p = 0.506]. Non-white participants registered higher levels of 
stigma on the Good/Bad BIAT [t(270) = 3.10, p = 0.002]. There were no differences 
based on race/ethnicity on the Innocent/Blameworthy BIAT [t(270) = -0.11, p = 0.911] or 
the Competent/Helpless BIAT [t(270) = 0.27, p = 0.786]. Participants with a psychiatric 
treatment history registered higher levels of stigma on the Good/Bad BIAT than those 
without a history of treatment [t(270) = 2.37, p = 0.018]. There were no differences based 
on treatment history on the Innocent/Blameworthy BIAT [t(270) = -0.05, p = 0.958] or 
the Competent/Helpless BIAT [t(270) = 0.07, p = 0.945].  
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Familiarity with Mental Illness, Personal Psychopathology, and Stigma Toward 
Mental Illness 
 In this section, the relationship between participants’ familiarity with mental 
illness, current level of psychiatric distress, and mental illness stigma is examined. The 
scientific literature has identified personal psychopathology and familiarity with mental 
illness as correlates of mental illness stigma (e.g., Quinn et al., 1999; Rusch et al., 
2010a). As such, these analyses were conducted in order to identify covariates needed for 
multivariate analyses.  
 Treatment History and Familiarity with Mental Illness. As presented in the 
Descriptive Statistics section above, independent-samples t-tests were conducted in order 
to determine whether there were significant differences in scores on the explicit and 
implicit stigma measures based on treatment history. As shown in Table 3 and Table 4, 
the only significant finding was that individuals with a treatment history scored higher on 
the Good/Bad BIAT than those without. This finding is consistent with much of the 
literature that suggest increased implicit self-stigma amongst outgroup members (e.g., 
Rusch et al., 2010b).  
 Due to the relationship between whether participants had received treatment and 
scores on the Good/Bad BIAT, treatment history was used as a covariate for group 
comparison and regression analyses on the implicit measures.  
 The Level of Contact Report measured the degree to which participants were 
familiar with mental illness. Table 5 shows the correlation between the attitude measures 
and identified covariates. As shown, Dangerousness, Willingness to Help, and Avoidance 
scale scores were negatively related to Level of Contact scores. The Responsibility, 
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Sympathy, Anger at Person, Anger at Condition, Fear, and Coercion scale scores were 
not significantly related to familiarity with mental illness.  
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Table 5  
 
Correlations Between Explicit and Implicit Stigma Scores and Covariates 
 
Note: * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 
Measure 
 
Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem  
CORE-
OM  
Level of 
Contact Report 
Treatment 
History 
AQ Responsibility  
 
0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.09 
AQ Sympathy  
 
-0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.05 
AQ Anger at Person  
 
-0.03 0.06 -0.08 -0.06 
AQ Anger at Condition  
 
-0.03 0.02 -0.12 -0.03 
AQ Dangerousness  
 
0.06 0.04 -0.13* -0.04 
AQ Fear  
 
-0.02 0.05 -0.11 -0.06 
AQ Willingness to Help  
 
0.00 -0.01 -0.15* -0.02 
AQ Coercion  
 
0.15* -0.10 -0.01 -0.10 
AQ Avoidance  0.09 -0.10 -0.16** -0.04 
SSMIS Stereotype 
Awareness  
 
0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
SSMIS Stereotype 
Agreement  
 
0.07 -0.03 -0.19** 0.04 
BIAT Good-Bad  
 
0.12 -0.09 0.05 0.14* 
BIAT Innocent-
Blameworthy  
 
-0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 
BIAT Competent-Helpless  
 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
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 As also can be seen in Table 5, scores on the SSMIS Stereotype Agreement 
measure were negatively related to Level of Contact scores. However, there was no 
relationship between SSMIS Stereotype Awareness and mental illness familiarity.  
 There was no significant relationship between any of the BIAT measures and 
Level of Contact scores. See Table 5 for correlations between stigma summary scores and 
Level of Contact scores. 
 Due to several significant negative relationships between experience with mental 
illness and scores on the explicit stigma measures, Level of Contact scores were used as a 
covariate for group comparison and regression analyses on the explicit measures.  
 Personal Psychopathology. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the CORE-
OM measured participants’ present level of psychopathology. As also seen in Table 5, 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale scores were not significantly related to SSMIS scores. 
However, self-esteem was positively related to AQ Coercion scale scores, suggesting that 
participants with higher self-esteem felt more strongly that individuals with mental illness 
should be forced to seek treatment. Self-esteem scores were negatively related to CORE-
OM and Level of Contact scores, indicating that participants with lower levels of self-
esteem tended to have higher psychiatric distress and greater contact with mental illness. 
CORE-OM scores were not significantly correlated with stigma measures, but were 
positively associated with Level of Contact scores, indicating that higher psychiatric 
distress was related to higher familiarity with mental illness.  
 Table 6 shows the correlations between the explicit mental illness stigma 
measures. Table 7 displays the correlations between the measures of implicit mental 
illness stigma. 
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Table 6 
 
Correlations Between Explicit Stigma Scores 
 
Note: *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01
Measure 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. AQ Responsibility Mean 
 
0.27** 0.24** 0.12* 0.11 0.12* 0.27** 0.12 0.30** 0.19** 0.02 
2. AQ Sympathy Mean 
 
 0.16** -0.08 0.04 0.07 0.35** -0.15* 0.18** 0.11 -0.04 
3. AQ Anger at Person Mean 
 
  0.64** 0.52** 0.58** 0.37** 0.20** 0.49** 0.36** -0.03 
4. AQ Anger at Condition Mean 
 
   0.40** 0.42** 0.22* 0.26** 0.35** 0.27** -0.03 
5. AQ Dangerousness Mean 
 
    0.83** 0.40** 0.31** 0.56** 0.52** 0.06 
6. AQ Fear Mean 
 
     0.44** 0.27** 0.55** 0.46** -0.02 
7. AQ Willingness to Help Mean 
 
      0.03 0.57** 0.41** 0.00 
8. AQ Coercion Mean 
 
       0.22** 0.20** 0.15* 
9. AQ Avoidance Mean 
 
        0.48** 0.09 
     10. SSMIS Stereotype Awareness  
 
        0.21** 0.04 
     11. SSMIS Stereotype Agreement 
 
         0.07 
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Table 7 
 
Correlations Between Explicit and Implicit Stigma Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 
 
 
  
Measure BIAT Good-Bad 
D-Score 
BIAT Innocent-
Blameworthy D-Score 
BIAT Competent-
Helpless D-Score 
AQ Responsibility  
 
-0.11 -0.13* 0.04 
AQ Sympathy 
 
0.04 0.00 -0.08 
AQ Anger at Person 
 
0.06 0.03 0.01 
AQ Anger at Condition  
 
0.02 0.00 0.06 
AQ Dangerousness  
 
-0.11 0.00 0.04 
AQ Fear  
 
-0.07 -0.03 0.03 
AQ Willingness to Help  
 
-0.02 0.03 -0.03 
AQ Coercion  
 
-0.09 0.07 0.03 
AQ Avoidance  -0.06 -0.02 0.02 
SSMIS Stereotype 
Awareness  
 
-0.03 0.00 0.08 
SSMIS Stereotype 
Agreement 
 
-0.05 -0.01 0.06 
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Manipulating PWE: Determinants of Stigma 
 In this section, the experimental manipulation of PWE is examined and the High 
PWE and Low PWE groups are compared. First, the composition of each group by 
demographic factors is discussed. Second, the experimental manipulation is assessed. 
Finally, group differences based on scores on the stigma measures are tested. 
 Group Composition. The High PWE (N = 139) and Low PWE (N = 133) 
conditions were compared on age, gender, race, treatment history, self-esteem, and 
psychiatric distress. There was not a difference in the mean age of participants between 
the High PWE (M = 19.14, SD = 1.26) and Low PWE (M = 19.25, SD = 1.30) groups 
[t(270) = -0.71, p = 0.479]. More participants assigned to the Low PWE group had a 
history of psychiatric treatment than did individuals in the High PWE group [2(1, N = 
272) = 4.50, p = 0.034]. As treatment history was identified as a covariate for scores on 
measures of implicit stigma, this natural difference between groups was already nullified 
in analyses in which treatment history was relevant. There were no differences between 
groups in terms of gender [2(1, N = 272) = 0.40, p = 0.528] or race [2(1, N = 272) = 
0.61, p = 0.436]. There were no significant differences between the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem scores of the High PWE (M = 18.94, SD = 3.01) and Low PWE (M = 18.69, SD 
= 3.60) groups [t(270) = 0.62, p = 0.533]. On the CORE-OM, there were no differences 
between High PWE (M = 1.04, SD = 0.50) and Low PWE (M = 1.16, SD = 0.53) groups 
[t(270) = -1.81, p = 0.072]. Likewise, no differences were noted between the High PWE 
(M = 7.60, SD = 3.12) and Low PWE (M = 7.83, SD = 2.97) groups on the Level of 
Contact Report [t(270) = -0.62, p = 0.533]. Based on these comparisons, the groups were 
judged to be equivalent. 
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 Manipulation Check. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the experimental 
manipulation, the comparison groups were compared on post-manipulation PWE Scale 
scores. An independent samples t-test revealed no differences between the High PWE (M 
= 49.12, SD = 8.25) and the Low PWE (M = 47.96, SD = 9.20) groups [t(270) = 1.09, p = 
0.277], which suggests that the manipulation was unsuccessful.  
 Ratings on the Speech Manipulation Questionnaire were also examined. Overall 
mean scores for each rating domain, including Speech Power (M = 5.15, SD = 1.12), 
Speech Content (M = 5.32, SD = 1.21), and Speech Message (M = 5.09, SD = 1.24) were 
comparable. An independent samples t-test revealed no differences between High PWE 
and Low PWE on Speech Power [t(270) = -1.30, p = 0.196], Speech Content [t(270) = -
1.50, p = 0.134], or Speech Message [t(270) = -1.19 , p = 0.236] ratings.  
 Group Comparisons. The High PWE and Low PWE groups were compared on 
the measures of stigma. Two MANCOVAs were utilized in order to evaluate differences 
between groups on the explicit measures of stigma. The first MANCOVA evaluated 
group differences on SSMIS scores. Comparison group was used as the independent 
variable with the SSMIS Stereotype Awareness and SSMIS Stereotype Agreement 
summary scores as the Dependent variables. As it was identified as a covariate to the 
explicit measures, Level of Contact scores were entered as a fixed factor. The test 
revealed no main effect for condition [Wilks’ λ = 0.99, F(2, 268) = 0.95, p = 0.390, 
partial eta square = 0.01, power = 0.21]. See Table 8 for mean scores and between-
subjects effects. 
 The second MANCOVA evaluated group differences on AQ scale scores. Again, 
no main effect was found [Wilks’ λ = 0.99, F(9, 261) = 0.48, p = 0.886, partial eta square 
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= 0.02, power = 0.24]. Likewise, there were no differences between groups on 
Responsibility, Sympathy, Anger at Person, Anger at Condition, Dangerousness, Fear, 
Willingness to Help, Coercion, or Avoidance scale scores. See Table 8 for mean scores 
and between-subjects effects. 
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Table 8 
 
Between-Subjects Effects From MANOVA of PWE Condition and Stigma Measures 
 
  
High PWE 
Group 
   
Low PWE 
Group 
   
 
Partial 
 
Measure    M SD  M SD F p  2 Power 
 
SSMIS 
         
   Stereotype Awareness 54.72 21.00  52.92 21.83 0.47 0.496 0.00 0.10 
   Stereotype 
Agreement 
 
27.56 12.20  29.08 15.58 1.06 0.305 0.00 0.18 
AQ          
   Responsibility 3.14 1.28  3.18 1.40 0.09 0.767 0.00 0.06 
   Sympathy 3.06 1.53  2.91 1.47 0.72 0.398 0.00 0.14 
   Anger at Person 2.21 1.18  2.33 1.37 0.68 0.409 0.00 0.13 
   Anger at Condition 3.15 1.51  3.47 1.68 2.94 0.088 0.01 0.40 
   Dangerousness 2.82 1.56  3.01 1.51 1.20 0.275 0.00 0.19 
   Fear 2.61 1.56  2.72 1.55 0.46 0.501 0.00 0.10 
   Willingness to Help 2.67 1.55  2.65 1.54 0.00 0.971 0.00 0.05 
   Coercion 4.93 1.69  5.02 1.59 0.24 0.626 0.00 0.08 
   Avoidance 3.58 1.53  3.62 1.58 0.11 0.739 0.00 0.06 
 
BIAT 
         
   Good/Bad 0.26 0.35  0.25 0.33 0.27 0.604 0.00 0.08 
   Innocent/ 
     Blameworthy 
0.08 0.37  0.04 0.35 1.47 0.226 0.01 0.23 
   Competent/Helpless    
 
0.08 0.31  0.09 0.32 0.03 0.868 0.00 0.05 
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 Finally, group differences in scores on the implicit measures of mental illness 
stigma were evaluated by a MANCOVA. Comparison group was entered as the 
independent variable, with the Good/Bad, Innocent/Blameworthy, and 
Competent/Helpless BIAT D-scores entered as Dependent variables. As it was identified 
as a covariate for implicit measures, treatment history was entered as a fixed factor. There 
was no main effect for condition [Wilks’ λ = 0.99, F(3, 266) = 0.58, p = 0.627, partial eta 
square = 0.01, power = 0.17]. Post-hoc analyses revealed no differences between 
conditions on Good/Bad, Innocent/Blameworthy, or Competent/Helpless D-scores. See 
Table 8 for mean scores and between-subjects effects. 
Post-Hoc Analysis: Measuring PWE 
 The manipulation check revealed that there were no differences between the 
comparison groups on PWE Scale scores. When considered in combination with the 
finding that the groups were equivalent on the measures of stigma, there is strong 
evidence to suggest that the experimental manipulation was ineffective. As such, it was 
assumed that participants’ PWE Scale scores represented their baseline levels of PWE 
orientation. In a series of post-hoc analyses conducted to evaluate further the relationship 
between PWE and mental illness stigma, PWE Scale scores were treated as a naturalistic 
variable and evaluated as predictors of mental illness stigma.  
 PWE as a Predictor of Explicit Mental Illness Stigma. Consistent with the 
hypotheses, it was expected that PWE scores would be associated with scores on the 
explicit stigma measures. Several stepwise multiple regression analyses were conducted 
using the SSMIS Stereotype Awareness, and SSMIS Stereotype Agreement scores 
individually as dependent variables. For each regression analysis, PWE scores were used 
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as a predictor variable entered in Step 2 with the previously identified covariate, level of 
familiarity with mental illness, entered in Step 1. Table 9 displays the results of multiple 
regression analysis for PWE scores predicting SSMIS scores. Findings revealed that 
PWE scores predicted SSMIS Stereotype Agreement scores. However, there was not a 
significant predictive relationship between PWE and SSMIS Stereotype Awareness 
scores. 
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Table 9 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis for PWE Score Predicting SSMIS Scores 
 
     Model 1      Model 2   
Summary Score Variable B SE B  R R2 
 B SE B  R R2 
 
SSMIS Stereotype 
Awareness 
 
Contact 
 
-0.12 
 
0.43 
 
-0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.00 
  
-0.09 
 
0.43 
 
-0.01 
 
0.12 
 
0.01 
 PWE 
Score 
      
0.29 0.15 0.12 
  
SSMIS Stereotype 
Agreement 
Contact 
-0.85 0.27 -0.19** 1.86 0.03 
 
-0.79 0.26 -0.17** 0.38 0.14 
 PWE 
Score 
      
0.52 0.09 0.33** 
  
Note: **p < 0.01 
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Additional stepwise multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the 
predictive relationship between PWE scores and AQ scale scores. For these analyses, 
each AQ scale score was individually entered as a dependent variable while PWE scores 
and Level of Contact scores were again entered as a predictor variable and covariate, 
respectively. Table 10 displays the results of multiple regression analysis for PWE scores 
predicting AQ scale scores. Findings revealed that PWE predicted scores on the 
Dangerousness and Avoidance scales. This indicated that participants’ level of PWE 
identification predicted the perceived level of threat of individuals with mental illness and 
the degree to which participants wanted to distance themselves from the mentally ill. 
There was no significant predictive relationship between PWE and scores on the 
Sympathy, Anger at Person, Anger at Condition, Fear, Willingness to Help, and Coercion 
scales. Participants’ PWE scores approached significance for predicting Responsibility 
scale scores. 
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Table 10 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis for PWE Score Predicting AQ Scale Scores  
 
    
Model 
1 
    
Model 
2 
   
AQ Scale Variable B SE B  R R2 
 
B SE B  R R2 
Responsibility Contact -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.23 0.00  -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.14 0.02 
 PWE 
Score 
      0.02 0.01 0.13   
Sympathy Contact 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.00  0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 
 PWE 
Score 
      0.01 0.01 0.05   
Anger at Person Contact -0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.83 0.01  -0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.13 0.02 
 PWE 
Score 
      0.02 0.01 0.11   
Anger at 
Condition 
Contact -0.06 0.03 -0.12 0.12 0.01  -0.06 0.03 -0.11 0.15 0.02 
 PWE 
Score 
      0.02 0.01 0.09   
Dangerousness Contact -0.07 0.03 -0.13* 0.13 0.16  -0.06 0.03 -0.12* 0.21 0.05 
 PWE 
Score 
      0.03 0.01 0.17**   
Fear Contact -0.05 0.03 -0.11 0.11 0.01  -0.05 0.03 -0.10 0.16 0.03 
 PWE 
Score 
      0.02 0.01 0.12   
Willingness to 
Help 
Contact -0.08 0.03 -0.15* 0.15 0.02  -0.08 0.03 -0.15* 0.17 0.03 
 PWE 
Score 
      0.01 0.01 0.08   
Coercion Contact 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 
 PWE 
Score 
      0.00 0.01 0.01   
Avoidance Contact -0.08 0.03 -0.16** 0.16 0.03  -0.08 0.03 -0.16** 0.21 0.04 
 PWE 
Score 
      0.02 0.01 0.13*   
Note: *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. 
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PWE as a Predictor of Implicit Mental Illness Stigma. Next, the relationship 
between PWE and the measures of implicit mental illness stigma was explored. It was 
expected that PWE would predict implicit mental illness stigma. Stepwise multiple 
regressions were again utilized. D-scores for each of the Good/Bad, 
Innocent/Blameworthy, and Competent/Helpless BIATs were used as Dependent 
variables. PWE scores were entered as the predictor variable in Step 2 with the identified 
covariate, treatment history, was entered in Step 1. Findings revealed no relationship 
between PWE scores and D-scores, indicating that PWE did not predict implicit mental 
illness stigma. See Table 11 for the regression analyses for PWE and BIAT scores. 
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Table 11 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis for PWE Score Predicting BIAT Scores 
 
    Model 1      Model 2   
Summary 
Score 
Variable B SE B β R R2  B SE B β R R2 
BIAT 
Good-Bad 
Treatment 
History 
0.12 0.05 0.14* 0.14 0.02  0.12 0.05 0.14* 0.15 0.02 
 PWE Score       0.00 0.00 0.04   
BIAT 
Innocent-
Blamewort
hy 
Treatment 
History 
0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 -0.05 0.00 
0.03 0.00 
 PWE Score       0.00 0.00 -0.03   
BIAT 
Competent-
Helpless 
Treatment 
History 
0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.05 0.01 
0.11 0.01 
 PWE Score       0.00 0.00 -0.11   
Note: *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. 
  
62 
The Effect of Contact on Explicit Mental Illness Stigma. Given the established 
connection between PWE Scale and explicit mental illness stigma scores, the relationship 
between Level of Contact scores and the previously identified explicit covariates (AQ 
Dangerousness, AQ Willingness to Help, AQ Avoidance, and SSMIS Stereotype 
Agreement scores) was again examined while controlling for PWE Scale scores. Findings 
revealed significant negative correlations for PWE scores and AQ Dangerousness (r = -
0.12, p = 0.043), AQ Willingness to Help (r = -0.15, p = 0.012), AQ Avoidance (r = -
0.16, p = 0.009), and SSMIS Stereotype Agreement (r = -0.18, p = 0.003). PWE scores 
had little effect on the relationship between familiarity with mental illness and scores on 
the explicit measures. These results indicate that level of familiarity with mental illness is 
negatively related to explicit mental illness stigma even when PWE orientation is 
considered.  
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Discussion 
 
 
Mental illness stigma remains a monumental barrier to treatment seeking and 
adherence. Indeed, the stigma of having a mental illness may cause as much distress and 
impairment as the illness itself (Corrigan, 1998). Negative attitudes can occur on the 
explicit and implicit levels, potentially making them difficult to evaluate and modify. 
Identifying the causes and determinants of the mental illness stigma process may be key 
to the continued development of successful interventions targeting negative attitudes 
toward the mentally ill.  
The scientific literature has identified the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) 
worldview (a meritocratic belief system in which individuals expect that good things 
come to those who work hard and take responsibility for problems and difficulties) as a 
key correlate of stigma toward the mentally ill (e.g., Rusch et al., 2010a). Research 
suggests that a reduction in PWE values may result in a decline in mental illness stigma 
(Norman et al., 2008).  
The present study attempted to experimentally manipulate participants’ PWE 
worldview in order to examine the effect of PWE orientation on explicit and implicit 
mental illness stigma. It is thus the first study, as far as could be discerned, to attempt to 
establish a causal link between PWE values and stigma toward the mentally ill. In 
addition, the present study expanded on the existing scientific literature through the 
utilization of a larger sample as well a wider array of measures. 
Evaluation of Hypotheses 
To summarize the study design, participants were randomly assigned to 
experimental groups intended to produce either High PWE or Low PWE. Depending on 
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the condition to which they were assigned, participants read either a High PWE or Low 
PWE-themed political speech. They were then asked to summarize the speech as a 
method to increase the salience of the manipulation. Next, participants completed explicit 
and implicit measures of attitudes toward mental illness.  
Three a priori hypotheses were evaluated. It was hypothesized that individuals 
who had received an experimental manipulation that sought to increase PWE values 
would have stronger implicit mental illness stigma than individuals who received a 
manipulation that sought to decrease PWE values. Similarly, it was predicted that 
individuals receiving the manipulation to increase PWE would report stronger explicit 
mental illness stigma than those receiving the manipulation to reduce PWE. Finally, it 
was hypothesized that the familiarity of participants with mental illness would be 
negatively related to their implicit and explicit mental illness stigma.  
PWE Group and Implicit Mental Illness Stigma. The manipulation was 
ineffective in changing PWE values and, thus, could not support the hypotheses. Due to 
the ineffectiveness of the manipulation, the relationship between PWE and implicit 
mental illness stigma was examined post-hoc. A multiple regression revealed no 
significant predictive relationship between PWE scores and BIAT scores. This indicated 
that participants’ PWE orientation did not predict their level of implicit mental illness 
stigma. This was surprising given the expectation that PWE would influence mental 
illness stigma on the implicit level. Given the paucity of research that directly considers 
implicit mental illness stigma, it is difficult to comprehensively explore the reasons for 
the lack of a relationship between PWE and implicit mental illness stigma. However, the 
limited amount of prior research may provide some insight.  
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Rusch and colleagues (2010a) found a relationship between PWE values and 
implicit attitudes only for participants without mental illness. Similarly, Quinn and 
Crocker (1999) observed a connection between PWE and stigma, but only for the group 
with psychiatric distress. It is possible, then, that PWE affects implicit mental illness 
stigma only for those who are considered to have mental illness. Data that included the 
degree of diagnostic specificity necessary for an analysis of this possibility was not 
collected by the present study. Treatment history was the only covariate for implicit 
mental illness stigma. Interestingly, psychiatric distress and contact with mental illness 
were not significantly related to implicit mental illness stigma. 
PWE Group and Explicit Mental Illness Stigma. Multiple regression analyses 
revealed that PWE predicted several dimensions of explicit mental illness stigma. 
Specifically, PWE values predicted the degree to which participants saw individuals with 
mental illness as responsible for their condition, the perceived dangerousness of the 
mentally ill, and the degree to which participants endorsed increased social distance. 
Additionally, PWE predicted the degree to which participants agreed with common 
stereotypes (e.g., “they are dirty”) about individuals with mental illness.  
PWE is noted to have a nuanced effect on explicit stigma (e.g., Rosenthal et al., 
2011), but it appears to have a relatively broad impact on explicit mental illness stigma. 
The findings from the present research are consistent with that of Rusch and colleagues 
(2010a) who also found a connection between PWE and the Dangerousness and 
Stereotype Agreement scales. Quinn and Crocker (1999) noted a relationship between 
PWE and explicit dislike of individuals with a stigmatizing condition (obesity).  
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Familiarity with Mental Illness and Stigma. Findings showed that lifetime 
contact with mental illness was negatively related to explicit, but not implicit, mental 
illness stigma. This indicated that participants with greater levels of familiarity with 
mental illness tended to endorse a lower degree of explicit stigma toward mental illness. 
Specifically, contact had an inverse relationship with the perceived dangerousness of, and 
the unwillingness to help, the mentally ill as well as the degree to which participants 
agreed with common stereotypes about the mentally ill. This is consistent with the work 
of Corrigan who has repeatedly shown a connection between contact with mental illness 
and stigma reduction (e.g., Corrigan & O'Shaughnessy, 2007; Corrigan & Penn, 1999; 
Kunda & Oleson, 1997). 
Implications of the Findings 
 The findings of this study have a number of potential implications for the way in 
which mental illness stigma is approached.  
The Effect of Protestant Work Ethic Values on Explicit Mental Illness Stigma. 
Findings of a consistent relationship between PWE values and conscious negative 
attitudes toward mental illness are very consistent with those of the existing literature. 
Individuals who strongly identify with PWE values seem to be more likely to see the 
mentally ill as dangerous, endorse social distance, and agree with common stereotypes of 
individuals with mental illness. 
Most of the existing mental illness stigma interventions focus on education and 
contact (see Dalky, 2012), with a few exceptions (e.g., advocacy and Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy; Corrigan & O'Shaughnessy, 2007; Masuda et al., 2007). These 
interventions are broadly effective. Further development and implementation of these 
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programs (particularly those involving contact) are important (Dalky, 2012). In line with 
Corrigan (2004a), the integration of values that run counter to the PWE (e.g., unity, 
willingness to help, open-mindedness, and acceptance) may supplement these 
interventions in a way that may be more lasting and accessible. Given the findings of the 
present study, this may be particularly true in the case of individuals who have prejudice 
toward the mentally ill but who also have some degree of knowledge and familiarity with 
mental illness. Values of unity and acceptance could be readily integrated into didactic 
interventions.  
Changing Implicit Mental Illness Stigma. General implicit mental illness stigma 
(observed through the findings on the Good/Bad BIAT) was identified by the present 
research. Interestingly, and consistent with the work of Rusch and colleagues (2010a) and 
Teachman and colleagues (2006), only two covariates were identified. For the Good/Bad 
BIAT, psychiatric treatment history was a negative correlate, indicating that treatment 
history was associated with greater implicit mental illness stigma. For the 
Innocent/Blameworthy BIAT, the Responsibility AQ scale was a negative correlate, 
indicating that higher scores on the Responsibility scale were associated with greater 
implicit blame. The relationship between the Innocent/Blameworthy BIAT and the 
Responsibility AQ scale makes conceptual sense. On the other hand, the positive 
relationship between the Good/Bad BIAT and psychiatric treatment history was 
counterintuitive. 
This relationship between psychiatric treatment and general implicit stigma is one 
of the more fascinating findings of the present research. Statistics reveal that the 
correlation cannot be explained by psychiatric distress or by familiarity with mental 
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illness. Although it is the opposite of what one might expect, it appears as though 
psychiatric treatment may lead to a greater degree of general, unconscious stigma toward 
mental illness. Of note, the mode (e.g., psychopharmacological versus psychotherapeutic) 
and length of treatment likely play a large role in whether implicit attitudes are reduced. 
Given that the type, length, and intensity of treatment history were not assessed, these 
factors could not be evaluated with the current data. There are a number of potential 
reasons for the relationship between treatment history and implicit mental illness stigma. 
First, implicit attitudes are difficult, and may take longer, to change than explicit 
attitudes (Saporito, Ryan, & Teachman, 2011). Second, treatment may help to internalize 
the “mentally ill” identity. Given there may not be a protective in-group bias (e.g., 
Teachman et al., 2006), this internalization may increase self-stigma and intensify 
identification with labels. Third, treatment might increase affective reactions to 
psychiatric symptoms. This increased emotionality would tend to affect attitudes more on 
the implicit, than explicit, levels (Link et al., 2004). Fourth, to speculate, the relationship 
between treatment and implicit mental illness stigma may be due to individual differences 
between people who seek treatment and those who do not seek treatment. Individual 
differences such as personality factors and emotional hardiness may affect how an 
individual responds to psychiatric distress and, thus, whether they pursue treatment. 
These individual differences may also determine the degree to which mental illness 
stigma is internalized. Regardless of potential reasons, the connection between treatment 
and higher levels of implicit mental illness stigma should be further examined.  
As implicit stigma was related to familiarity with mental illness, one might 
question the utility of traditional stigma interventions (e.g., contact, education) in 
69 
reducing implicit bias toward the mentally ill. However, research suggests that implicit 
negative attitudes about the mentally ill may persist even amongst mental health 
professionals despite their experience and education (Stuber, Rocha, Christian, & Link, 
2014). Further exploration into the nature of implicit mental illness stigma change is 
needed. 
The Value of Familiarity with Mental Illness. In vivo exposure to mental illness 
is an important factor in mitigating mental illness stigma. In the present study, the 
negative relationship between contact with the mentally ill and explicit mental illness 
stigma remained consistent even when controlling for PWE values. This suggests that, 
even for individuals with worldviews that predispose them to be biased against the 
mentally ill, exposure should be a key element in interventions designed to reduce 
stigma. While contact and education may or may not be effective in reducing implicit 
mental illness stigma, these interventions are likely quite effective in reducing explicit 
mental illness stigma. Future interventions for stigma reduction should have a component 
of exposure and/or education. 
Limitations  
There were several limitations to this study. First, there were some concerns with 
regard to the internal consistency of the Responsibility and Anger at Condition scales of 
the AQ. Second, the manipulation was unsuccessful and post-hoc analyses were 
necessitated to examine the hypotheses. Third, the internal validity of the Political Speech 
Questionnaire is questionable. Fourth, the point at which the manipulation check (the 
PWE Scale) was administered may have been too long after the manipulation to properly 
capture the effect. Finally, the sample was limiting in that participants had a relatively 
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high level of current psychiatric distress, were mainly women, were of a young age, and 
were university-level students. Given their enrollment in a Jesuit institution, it is possible 
that the participants were somewhat more religious than the general population, although 
no data was collected to evaluate this possibility.  
 Potential Limitations of the AQ and the BIATs. The AQ was noted to have a 
number of potentially limiting attributes. Most notably, the internal consistency of two of 
the AQ scales (Responsibility and Anger at Condition) was less than desirable. The 
questionable internal consistency may have limited the reliability of these scales, 
reducing the power of the regression analyses. This may explain why PWE scores were 
just shy of a being a significant predictor of the Responsibility scale. Due to the 
importance of these scales to the present research, Responsibility and Anger at Condition 
scale scores were included in analyses. However, their inclusion may represent a limiting 
factor. 
 The Implicit Association Test (IAT) has been subject to frequent critical 
examination. Several potential points of criticism include the possibility that the IAT 
effect is due to salience asymmetry, the potential for faking, and difficulties in predicting 
subsequent behavior. Additionally, research utilizing the IAT methodology toward 
examining mental illness stigma is limited, although the IAT has been used to measure 
mental illness stigma much more frequently than other implicit stigma tools. 
Several studies have suggested that the IAT effect may reflect category salience 
rather than true preference. Rothermund and Wentura (2001) presented the figure-ground 
model, which states that IAT effects are due directly to differences in salience between 
the task categories. Salience asymmetry is based on differences in familiarity or valence 
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between IAT categories and are manifested through “attentional dwell time” 
(Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). Using a modified version of a Young/Old IAT in which 
words and nonwords were used as attribute categories instead of valenced adjectives, 
expected differences were still found (Rothermund et al., 2004) consistent with prior 
research (Rothermund et al., 2001). A similar study used a modified Flower/Insect IAT to 
examine the role of category familiarity in the IAT effect (Kinoshita & Peek-O’Leary, 
2006). Evidence suggested that IAT effects might be due to either valence or familiarity. 
These findings are consistent with the figure-ground model. 
Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, and Klauer (2005) agreed that salience asymmetry 
could affect IAT scores, but argued that the “nominal features” (i.e., features activated by 
the names typically associated with categories, such as “age” when contrasting young and 
old) are the driving force of the IAT effect. Greenwald and colleagues also noted a 
number of empirical studies that support the nominal features interpretation of the IAT 
effect as opposed to the salience asymmetry interpretation (Greenwald et al., 2005). 
Some limited evidence suggests that it may be possible to misrepresent implicit 
attitudes on the IAT. Kim (2003) presented findings that completers of the IAT could 
manipulate their IAT scores, but only if completers were provided with specific 
instructions (e.g., responding more slowly to a certain category) on how to do so.  
The degree to which IAT scores can predict future behavior is presently unclear. 
A growing amount of research has examined the IAT using the “known groups” validity 
approach, in order to gauge the association between IAT scores and behavior (Fazio et 
al., 2003). While a number of studies have provided support for the IAT in predicting 
known behavior, some evidence suggests that the IAT is limited in this regard. One study 
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indicated that IAT scores show no predictive value of participants’ subsequent choice of 
whether to eat apples or candy bars (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). It is possible that IAT 
measures of self-esteem may be more predictive of subsequent behavior (Karpinski & 
Hilton, 2001). 
 There were indications from the present study that suggest the BIAT was effective 
in accurately measuring implicit attitudes. First, BIAT scores for the full sample were as 
expected, with physical illness favored over mental illness in terms of general preference 
(Good/Bad BIAT) as well as for (less significant) implicit attributions toward the 
mentally ill (Innocent/Guilty and Competent/Helpless). Second, the significant 
relationship between Innocent/Guilty BIAT scores and Responsibility AQ scale scores 
provided some additional convergent validity for the BIAT measures. The correlation 
between the Innocent/Guilty BIAT and Responsibility AQ scale scores were as would be 
anticipated (expected range of r = 0.1-0.3). 
 Manipulation, Political Speech Questionnaire, and Manipulation Check. 
Although the initial design was experimental, the manipulation of PWE values was 
ultimately unsuccessful. As such, the relationships between PWE and mental illness 
stigma were evaluated post-hoc, thus the connection between the PWE worldview and 
mental illness stigma cannot be considered casual despite the strength and breadth of the 
relationship. There were a number of factors to evaluate when considering why the 
manipulation failed. The most likely explanation is that the manipulation did not have the 
necessary salience to elicit the intended increase in PWE identification or, at least, not for 
the desired amount of time. That the political speeches were based on a State of the 
Union Address delivered by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s may have limited the degree to 
73 
which participants (who were all born in the 1990s) identified with the content. 
Additionally, the manipulation itself was administered to a sample of female college 
students with weight concerns and originally designed for that purpose. Since the present 
sample was not known to have these weight concerns, this may explain a portion of why 
the manipulation did not succeed. The nature of the administration (self-administered, in 
a group setting, by computer, visual only) of the manipulation may have also been 
problematic in that it could have led to inconsistencies in task comprehension and a 
greater chance of inattention. Administration individually in a manner in which 
experimenters could be certain that participants received the manipulation as intended 
(such as by video) may have improved the efficacy of the manipulation. It is also possible 
that the manipulation check was unsuccessful, despite having multiple components. 
The Speech Rating Questionnaire was designed to evaluate, and increase, the 
salience of the manipulation as well as to serve as a manipulation check. While designed 
to evaluate the salience of different aspects of participants’ assigned speech (overall 
power, power of the message, and power of the content of the speech), each of the three 
rating questions had comparable means and relatively limited variability across the 
sample. These findings provided some evidence that the measure did an insufficient job 
in evaluating the true salience of the speech manipulation. Thus, the measure may have 
been limited as a manipulation check.  
The PWE Scale was administered at the end of the protocol in order to avoid any 
contaminating effect that earlier administration might cause. Any temporary effect on 
PWE values caused by the manipulation may have extinguished by the time participants 
completed the PWE Scale. Unfortunately, the length of time for which PWE 
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manipulations remain effective is not clear given the lack of existing research. The 
creation of further methods by which to manipulate the PWE may be necessary for future 
experimental investigations of the PWE.  
Sample Limitations. There were a number of concerns with the sample. First, 
there was a relatively high level of current psychiatric distress when compared with 
national non-clinical norms (see Table 2 for mean scores). Although one might expect a 
slightly higher level of psychiatric distress among psychology students, the number of 
participants reporting clinical levels of symptoms was notable. Second, there were a far 
greater number of female participants than male participants. There were a number of 
significant differences between how men and women responded on the explicit measures. 
While these differences had no effect on the utility of the manipulation (there were no 
gender composition differences between groups), this remains an important limitation 
when considering how well the data generalize. Individuals in the sample were also 
traditional college-aged, with the oldest participant being twenty-four, further limiting the 
generalizability of the findings. Given their enrollment in a Jesuit institution, it is possible 
that the participants were somewhat more religious than the general population, although 
no data was collected to evaluate this possibility. Further, participants’ background in 
psychology might have affected how participants responded. To speculate, participants 
with a psychology background are likely more progressive with their views toward 
mental illness, which would tend to temper explicit mental illness stigma. Additionally, 
psychology students may be more motivated to engage in impression management (i.e., 
“I am not supposed to endorse stigma toward mental illness”). These factors further 
complicate generalizability of the data.  
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Future Research 
Future research should seek to expand on the current study as well as address the 
noted shortcomings. Of primary importance is the continued effort to evaluate a causal 
link between the PWE worldview and mental illness stigma. Replication of this research 
with a broader, more representative, sample would be beneficial. Establishing a standard 
method for evaluating PWE (and meritocratic worldviews in general) would be very 
valuable toward continued exploration of the relationship between PWE and stigma 
toward mental illness. Evaluating the PWE worldview within the context of stigma 
reduction interventions would be intriguing. Given the consistent predictive connection 
between PWE and desired avoidance of the mentally ill, social distance measures may 
have continued utility in future research as brief instruments. Finally, the IAT 
methodology should continue to be evaluated within the context of attitudes about mental 
illness. 
 Toward the goal of creating more effective interventions aimed at reducing 
mental illness stigma, it is important that the relationship between the PWE worldview 
and mental illness stigma be explored in an experimental fashion. Key to achieving this, 
of course, is the successful development of an experimental manipulation of PWE values. 
The political speech manipulation has been used successfully in prior research, but was 
ineffective in the current study. Addressing some of the potential limitations of the 
manipulation noted above may be helpful. If the political speech manipulation design is 
utilized in future studies, additional steps should be taken to make sure that the 
manipulation is delivered by an experimenter in a way that is consistent for each 
participant. Additionally, the speeches used as manipulations should be based on a more 
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modern speech rather than one from decades past. Experimental methodologies utilizing 
vignettes may be another option for manipulating PWE values. It will also be important 
for researchers to continue to develop ways to identify and modify implicit attitudes 
toward mental illness. 
 The present research would benefit greatly from being replicated with a more 
representative sample. Greater variability in demographic factors (e.g., age, gender, 
race/ethnicity, SES, and religiosity) as well an overall reduction in sample 
psychopathology would substantially increase the generalizability of findings. Recruiting 
participants from outside a university setting would be key.  
 Future research should also focus on the practical application of these findings 
toward intervening in the process of mental illness stigma and the mitigation of the 
effects of discrimination toward and self-stigmatization of the mentally ill. Contact with 
the mentally ill (particularly those individuals who are high functioning) has been 
consistently identified in the literature as a method to reduce stigma. This study adds to 
that literature. Integrating and encouraging greater contact with high functioning 
individuals with mental illness may be useful as a therapeutic technique in order to 
reduce self-stigma. Additionally, increasing awareness and contact with these individuals 
for people without mental illness could be helpful toward reducing mental illness stigma 
in the general public. The positive relationship between implicit mental illness stigma and 
psychiatric treatment history should be explored in depth. 
 IAT (and BIAT) measures should continue to be scrutinized, particularly within 
the realm of attitudes about mental illness. An overall effect for each of the BIAT 
measures was found, indicating that the overall sample performed as expected. However, 
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there was only one relationship between the implicit attitude data and other scores (the 
aforementioned correlation between the Innocent/Guilty BIAT and the Responsibility AQ 
scale). It was expected that there would be a broad, but small, positive relationship 
(approximately r = 0.19 as described by Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & 
Schmitt, 2005) between the BIAT data and the AQ and SSMIS data, particularly when 
accounting for covariates (consistent with Rusch et al., 2010b, Greenwald et al., 1998, & 
Greenwald et al., 2001), but this was not the case.  
Conclusion 
The connection between the PWE worldview and mental illness stigma was 
considered in depth. As was expected, there was a strong relationship between PWE 
values and conscious mental illness stigma. No relationship was found between PWE 
values and implicit, unconscious stigma. Level of contact with the mentally ill has a 
reliable, negative relationship with explicit mental illness stigma, which is consistent with 
a body of research identifying contact as an important part of stigma reduction. 
Emphasizing values of unity, acceptance, and a willingness to help and deemphasizing 
PWE-related values may be a useful extension to current methods of stigma intervention. 
The present study would benefit greatly from replication with an improved experimental 
manipulation and with a more generalizable sample of participants. Additionally, the 
connection between psychiatric treatment and implicit mental illness stigma should be 
considered further. Continued progress toward understanding the effects of meritocratic 
worldviews on mental illness stigma may be important toward improving the future for 
those affected by mental illness. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
“Political Speech” Experimental Manipulation and Questionnaire 
 
High Protestant Work Ethic Speech 
America is a country where people can stand proud on their accomplishments. A place 
where people are free to live and to achieve to their highest potential. Self-reliance and 
self-discipline are the cornerstones of this country. Perhaps one of the most important 
beliefs we can hold is the unwavering notion that each person controls his or her own 
outcomes. We do not blame others for our failures. Instead each person is responsible for 
his or her own rewards and punishments. Those who are willing to work hard towards 
their goals have an excellent chance of succeeding. Only the lazy and the unwilling will 
be unable to meet the goals they set out for themselves. All who strive for perfection 
should be commended. No persons will blame others for their problems. Instead, we will 
all accept the responsibility for our flaws as we also accept the responsibility and praise 
for our accomplishments. Only in these ways can we assert that we have truly endeavored 
to be our personal best. 
 
Low Protestant Work Ethic Speech 
America is a country in which we strive to combine our differences into unity. It is a 
country that is not only rich in opportunities for the individual but also for families and 
vibrant neighborhoods. A country whose divergent but harmonizing communities are a 
reflection of deeper community values. The most exciting revolution ever known to 
humankind began with these three simple words: "We the People. . ." the revolutionary 
notion that the people grant government its rights, and not the other way around. Just as 
those who created this Republic pledged to each other their lives, their fortunes, and their 
sacred honor, so, too, America's leaders today must pledge to each other that we will 
keep foremost in our hearts and minds not what is best for ourselves or for our party, but 
what is best for America. In the spirit of Jefferson, let us affirm that, we must work as 
though there are no Republicans, no Democrats, just Americans. Yes we will have our 
differences, but let us always remember what unites us far outweighs whatever divides 
us.  
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“Political Speech” Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: Please answer the following questions about the speech you just read. 
 
 Extremely 
Weak 
 
 
 
 Neither 
Weak 
nor 
Powerful 
  Extremely 
Powerful 
I rate the overall 
power of the 
speech as 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I consider the 
message of the 
speech to be 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I consider the 
content of the 
speech to be 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
In a single sentence, please summarize the message of the speech. Please write only one 
sentence. 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________  
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Attribution Questionnaire  
 
Harry is a 30 year-old single man with schizophrenia. Sometimes he hears voices and 
becomes upset. He lives alone in an apartment and works as a clerk at a large law firm. 
He has been hospitalized in the past because of his illness. 
 
Instructions: Now answer each of the following questions about Harry. Indicate the 
number of the best answer to each question. 
 
 Not 
at all 
       Very 
much 
I would think 
that Harry’s 
present condition 
is his own fault. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Harry must have 
done something 
that has caused 
him to be in his 
present 
condition. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Harry should not 
be held 
responsible for 
his present 
condition. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
How much 
control do you 
think Harry has 
over his present 
condition? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I would feel 
sorry for Harry. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
How much 
sympathy would 
you feel for 
Harry? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I would feel bad 
for Harry. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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How angry 
would you feel at 
Harry? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I would be mad 
at Harry. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I would feel 
aggravated by 
Harry. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Harry’s present 
condition would 
anger me. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Harry’s condition 
would upset me. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Harry would be a 
danger to others. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Harry would be a 
potential danger 
to anyone he 
encounters. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
If I had a friend 
dating Harry, I 
would feel scared 
for her. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I would feel 
threatened by 
Harry. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I would fear 
Harry. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
How frightened 
of Harry would 
you feel? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I would feel 
scared being 
around Harry. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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I would be 
willing to help 
Harry 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I would be 
willing to talk to 
Harry about his 
present 
condition. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Would you want 
to help Harry? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I think Harry 
should be forced 
to take 
medication to 
improve his 
present 
condition. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Society should 
force Harry to 
seek treatment. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Harry should be 
forced to seek 
counseling. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
If I were in 
charge of Harry’s 
medication, I 
would give him 
the option of 
discontinuing it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I would not want 
to be around 
Harry. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
If I were a 
landlord, I would 
rent an apartment 
to Harry. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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If you worked 
with Harry, how 
willing would 
you be to be in a 
work-group with 
Harry? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I would share a 
carpool with 
Harry every day. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
Self-Stigma of Mental Illness Stereotype Awareness and Stereotype Agreement 
Scales 
 
Instructions: There are many attitudes about mental illness. We would like to know what 
you think most of the public as a whole (or most people) believe about these attitudes. 
Please answer using the scale above the items. 
 
I think the public believes… 
 I 
strongly 
Disagree 
   Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagre
e 
   I 
strongly 
Agree 
most persons 
with mental 
illness cannot 
be trusted. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
disgusting. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
unable to get 
or keep a 
regular job. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
dirty and 
unkempt. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are to 
blame for 
their 
problems. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
below 
average in 
intelligence. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
unpredictable. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness will 
not recover or 
get better. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
dangerous. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
unable to take 
care of 
themselves. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Instructions: Now answer the next 10 items using the agreement scale for you own 
beliefs. 
 
I think… 
 I 
strongly 
Disagree 
   Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagre
e 
   I 
strongly 
Agree 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are to 
blame for 
their 
problems. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
unpredictable. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness will 
not recover or 
get better. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
unable to get 
or keep a 
regular job. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
dirty and 
unkempt. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
dangerous. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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most persons 
with mental 
illness cannot 
be trusted. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
below 
average in 
intelligence. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
unable to take 
care of 
themselves. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
most persons 
with mental 
illness are 
disgusting. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
BIAT Stimuli 
 
Category Stimulus 1 Stimulus 2 Stimulus 3 Stimulus 4 
Mental Disorder Depression Schizophrenia Bipolar 
Disorder 
Obsessive-
Compulsive 
Disorder 
Physical 
Disorder 
Diabetes Appendicitis Cerebral Palsy Multiple 
Sclerosis 
Good Excellent Joyful Wonderful Great 
Bad Horrible Nasty Terrible Awful 
Innocent Faultless Virtuous Innocent Guiltless 
Blameworthy Culpable At Fault Guilty Blameworthy 
Competent Capable Qualified Competent Able 
Helpless Incompetent Helpless Incapable Unable 
 !
 
 ! !
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Protestant Ethic Scale 
 
Instructions: Please rate the following statements in terms of your level of agreement. 
 
 I 
disagree 
strongly 
     I agree 
strongly 
Most people 
spend too much 
time in 
unprofitable 
amusements. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our society would 
have fewer 
problems if 
people had less 
leisure time. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Money acquired 
easily is usually 
spent unwisely. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Most people who 
don’t succeed in 
life are just plain 
lazy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Anyone who is 
willing and able to 
work hard has a 
good chance of 
succeeding. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
People who fail at 
a job have usually 
not tried hard 
enough. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Life would have 
very little 
meaning if we 
never had to 
suffer. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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The person who 
can approach an 
unpleasant task 
with enthusiasm is 
the person who 
gets ahead. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
 
If people work 
hard enough they 
are likely to make 
a good life for 
themselves. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
I feel uneasy 
when there is little 
work for me to do. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A distaste for hard 
work usually 
reflects a 
weakness of 
character. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 !! !
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Level of Contact Report 
 
Instructions: Please read each of the following statements carefully. After you have read 
all the statements below, place a check by the statements that best depict your exposure to 
persons with a severe mental illness. 
 
✓ Statements (Rank) 
☐ I have watched a movie or television show in which a character depicted a person 
with mental illness. (3) 
 
☐ My job involves providing services/treatment for persons with a severe mental 
illness. (8) 
 
☐ I have observed, in passing, a person I believe may have had a severe mental illness. 
(2) 
 
☐ I have observed persons with a severe mental illness on a frequent basis. (5) 
 
☐ I have a severe mental illness. (12) 
 
☐ I have worked with a person who had a severe mental illness at my place of 
employment. (6) 
 
☐ I have never observed a person that I was aware had a severe mental illness. (1) 
 
☐ My job includes providing services to persons with a severe mental illness. (7) 
 
☐ A friend of the family has a severe mental illness. (9) 
 
☐ I have a relative with a severe mental illness. (10) 
 
☐ I have watched a documentary on the television about severe mental illness. (4) 
 
☐ I live with a person who has a severe mental illness. (11) 
 !
